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HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 
LIFE AND SERVICES 

OF 

WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

Major General, United States Volunteers 

in 

THE CIVIL WAR 



A SKETCH 



BY 



JAMES HARRISON WILSON 
Major General, U. S.V. 



[ The John M. Rogers Press ) 
Wilmington, Del. J 

1904 S 









3GJa'05 



12T 



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Heroes of the Great Conflict 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 

WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

MAJOR GENERAL, U. S. V. 



WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH, 
the subject of this sketch, grad- 
uated at West Point in 1845, 
fourth in a class of forty-one members. 
He died at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
on the 28th of February, 1903 in his 
seventy-ninth year. 

The publication of the Rebellion 
Records puts within the reach of every 
student the official reports of the various 
campaigns and battles of the Great Con- 
flict, but something more is needed. 
They deal but slightly with men's mo- 
tives, and still less with their personal 
peculiarities. They give only here and 
there any idea whatever of the origin of 
the plans of campaigns or battles and 
rarely any adequate description of the 
topography of the theatre of war, or of 
the difficulties to be overcome. They 
describe but superficially the organiza- 
tion, equipment, armament and supply 



6 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

of the troops, and leave their trials, hard- 
ships and extraordinary virtues largely to 
the imagination. They are entirely si- 
lent as to the qualities and idiosyncrasies 
of the leaders. Neither romance nor per- 
sonal adventure finds any place within 
their pages, and fine writing is entirely 
foreign to their purpose. They are for 
the most part dry and unemotional in 
style, and are put together so far as pos- 
sible chronologically in the order of their 
importance without the slightest refer- 
ence to literary effect. While nothing is 
more untrustworthy generally than per- 
sonal recollections of events which took 
place over a third of a century ago, those 
which are supported by letters and diaries 
are of inestimable value in construing 
and reconciling the official reports. But 
this is not all. The daily journals and 
other contemporaneous publications are 
quite important and cannot be safely left 
out of account. All must be taken into 
consideration before the final distribution 
of praise and blame is made, or the last 
word is written in reference to events or 
to the great actors who controlled or 
took part in them. 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT J 

In the list of the most notable men 
of the day the name of Major General 
William Farrar Smith must be re- 
corded. He belonged at the outbreak 
of the Civil War, to that distinguished 
group of which Lee on the Southern 
side and McClellan on the Northern, 
were the center. Joseph E. Johnston 
and William B. Franklin were his most 
intimate friends, and I but recall what 
was then the popular belief when I state 
that they were widely regarded as the 
best educated and the most brilliant offi- 
cers in the service. They were in middle 
life, in the full enjoyment of their pow- 
ers, and it was the confident opinion of 
those who knew them best, that they 
were sure to become conspicuous leaders 
in the impending conflict. Great things 
were expected of them, and in this the 
world was not disappointed. They all 
reached high rank and great distinction, 
but only one of the group was fortunate 
enough to enroll himself amongst the 
world's great commanders. Johnston 
rose to the leadership of an independent 
army but failed to win a great victory or 
to secure the entire approval of his su- 



8 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 



periors. Franklin was without doubt a 
corps commander of sound judgment and 
unshakable courage, but he also failed to 
achieve the success that was expected of 
him, and to secure the support and con- 
fidence that his high character fully en- 
titled him to look for from his Govern- 
ment. Smith who was not inferior to 
the ablest of his friends and contem- 
poraries, in the art and science of war, 
had a career of great usefulness, in which 
he rendered services of extraordinary 
value and brilliancy but which ended in 
disappointment and unhappiness. 

He was however not only a conspicu- 
ous officer connected with important 
events throughout his life, and especially 
during the Great Conflict, but he was 
a singularly virile and independent char- 
acter who exerted great influence over all 
with whom he came in contact. He was 
strong, self-contained and deliberate in 
speech, and having been an industrious 
student and an acute thinker all his life, 
his opinions always commanded atten- 
tion and respect. It so happened that 
his services brought him into the very 
focus of events on more than one occa- 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 



sion. It so happened also that I was 
more or less intimate with him to the 
time of his death, from the date of my 
entry into the Military Academy, where 
I had the good fortune to receive his in- 
struction in mathematics. I first met him 
in the field, while I was serving tempo- 
rarily on the staff of General McClellan, 
and he was commanding a division in the 
Antietam campaign, and next at Chatta- 
nooga, whither I was sent in advance of 
General Grant to prepare for his coming, 
after the disastrous battle of Chicka- 
mauga. 

Shortly afterwards Smith was trans- 
ferred to Grant's staff as Chief Engineer, 
and we messed and served together, in 
the closest intimacy throughout that cam- 
paign, and until I was assigned to duty 
in the War Department in charge of the 
Cavalry Bureau. I saw him frequently 
while I was commanding a division of 
cavalry and he an army corps in Grant's 
overland campaign against Richmond. 
During the latter period we were exceed- 
ingly intimate, and when we were not 
serving together an active correspond- 
ence was kept up between us. It is a 



IO GENERALWILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

source of pleasure and satisfaction to 
me that this intimacy became still closer 
after General Smith was appointed agent 
of the United States and assigned as 
a civil engineer to the charge of the 
river and harbor works on the Delaware 
and Maryland peninsula, with his office 
at Wilmington, Delaware. This long 
and close intimacy, extending as it did 
over the greater part of a lifetime, has 
afforded me an ample opportunity of 
studying his character and familiarizing 
myself with the facts of his military 
career, and with the point of view from 
which he considered his relations to the 
men and events with which he was so 
conspicuously connected. 

A man of great purity of character 
and great singleness of purpose, he took 
an intense interest in whatever his hand 
found to do. He felt a deep and abid- 
ing concern in all public and professional 
questions, and was both a tender and 
affectionate friend and an unrelenting 
enemy. He was a bold and resolute 
thinker who indulged in no half way 
measures. The bolder his plans and the 
more dangerous his undertakings, the 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT II 

more careful was he in working out the 
details, and the more attentive was he 
in supervising their execution. He left 
nothing to chance, but provided for every 
possible contingency with infinite care 
and yet he was a rapid worker. Meth- 
odical in his habits, untiring in his appli- 
cation and deliberate in his manner, he 
was always ready, always on time and 
nearly always successful. 

In following him through the trials 
and vicissitudes of his active life it will 
be seen that he was one of the most in- 
teresting personalities of his day. He 
played a bold and distinguished part in 
the war for the Union, quite out of pro- 
portion to the actual command which 
fell to his lot. Indeed, it may well be 
doubted if any other single officer ex- 
erted a more potential or beneficial in- 
fluence than he did upon the plans and 
operations in which he took part. While 
he was austere and reserved in manners, 
he was most highly esteemed by all with 
whom he served, and received unstinted 
praise for his suggestions and assistance, 
and yet strangely enough he became in- 
volved in several notable military con- 



12 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

troversies, which so enlisted his interest 
and wounded his pride as to materially 
change his career and cause him great 
unhappiness, during the later years of 
his life. 

It may be truly said that he came to 
know by experience the dangers of frank- 
ness and friendly criticism, and that even 
the most patriotic and unselfish men in 
these modern times, like those of antiq- 
uity "have their ambitions which neither 
seas normountains nor unpeopled deserts 
can limit ;" their egotism and personal 
interests "which neither victory nor far- 
reaching fame can suppress;" their secret 
motives and purposes which "cause them 
to injure one another when they touch 
and are close together." After all, gen- 
erals and statesmen are but fallible men, 
the most magnanimous of whom are 
watchful of their rivals, and love not 
those who despitefully use them. In the 
vindication of his claims that he has 
rendered some service to his country, 
General Smith has made several valuable 
contributions""' to current American his- 



*From Chattanooga to Petersburg under Generals Grant and 
Butler, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., N. Y. 1893. 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 1 3 

tory, and has in addition left a manu- 
script volume of personal memoirs upon 
which I shall draw as occasion offers, 
and which will doubtless be published 
in due time. They were written during 
the last two years of his life and throw 
an interesting light, not only upon his 
own deeds and character, but upon the 
life and services of his friends and co- 
temporaries. They are conceived in a 
kindly and charitable vein which does 
credit both to his heart and to his under- 
standing. 

William Farrar Smith was born at 
St. Albans, in Northern Vermont, on 
the 1 7th of February, 1 824. He came of 
good New England stock, which emi- 
grated from Massachusetts to the valley 
of Lake Champlain before the beginning 
of the last century. Both his paternal 
and maternal ancestors and relations were 
notable people, and took prominent parts 
in the troubles of a thinly-settled fron- 
tier, and especially in the French and 
Indian war, and in the Committee of 
Safety, as well as in the militia and vol- 
unteers during the Revolutionary War. 
They fought at the battle of Lake 



14 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

George, at the capture of Fort Ticon- 
deroga, and at the affairs at Hubbardton 
and Bennington. They were the com- 
panions of Stark, Seth Warner and 
Ethan Allen, and appear to have borne 
themselves bravely and well upon all 
occasions. They were by name Robin- 
sons, Saffords, Fays, Butlers and Smiths. 
There is a well-founded tradition that 
his father's family, which came from the 
old hill town of Barre, Massachusetts, 
were known during the earlier colonial 
days as Smithson, but before emigrating 
to Vermont dropped the second syllable 
for the sake of simplicity, and always 
thereafter called themselves Smith. 

William's father was a respectable 
farmer at or near St. Albans. His uncle 
John was a lawyer and a judge of dis- 
tinction, and during the excitement 
growing out of the Canadian rebellion of 
1837, was elected to the next Congress. 
He was a Democrat and the only one up 
to that time ever elected from the State. 
During his term of service he gave the 
appointment of cadet at West Point to 
his nephew William. His cousin John 
Gregory Smith, also a lawyer of distinc- 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT I 5 

tion, was afterwards Governor of Ver- 
mont, and for many years president of 
the Vermont Central and Northern Pa- 
cific Railroads. His grandmother Smith 
also from Barre, was the sister of a cer- 
tain Captain Gregory of the Highland 
regiment serving in Boston before the 
Revolution. Through this connection 
the General always believed he received 
a strain of McGregor blood, for many 
of that clan took the name of Gregory 
after their immigration to the colonies. 

His own mother was Sarah Butler, a 
direct descendent of Isaac and Samuel 
Robinson who were believed to have 
come in the direct line from the cele- 
brated puritan pastor, John Robinson, 
of Leyden, who was long recognized by 
even those who differed with him on 
questions of doctrine as "the most learn- 
ed, polished and modest spirit that ever 
separated from the Church of England." 
To the prepotency of this distinguished 
divine, General Smith often, in a tone of 
mingled banter and seriousness, attribu- 
ted not only his habit of mature reflec- 
tion and love of learning, but also his 
"moderation combined with firmness" 



I 6 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 



upon all questions which engaged his 
attention. 

Be all this as it may, it is certain that 
his family were straight Anglo-Saxons, 
who like the rest, came into New Eng- 
land under the pressure of religious and 
political disturbance at home, and 
brought with them the sturdy virtues 
and ineradicable prejudices of their race. 
It is equally certain that this race, what- 
ever its origin and however it may have 
been compounded and produced, has 
thriven and expanded in America, and 
that our country is indebted to it for 
not only its greatest scholars, divines 
and statesmen, but for its greatest sold- 
iers as well. General Smith belonged 
by nature and education to both classes, 
and before this sketch is concluded I 
hope to show that in the highest walks 
of his chosen profession he had few 
equals and no superiors. 

Like many another youth, his latent 
love of arms and his determination to 
go to West Point were aroused by see- 
ing a company of regular soldiers, and 
making the acquaintance of its officers, 
at his native town. They were sent there 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT I J 

to maintain order and prevent violations 
of the neutrality laws during the Cana- 
dian disturbances in 1 83 7 — 8- From the 
day of his cadetship he received the 
sobriquet and was always thereafter des- 
ignated familiarly by his more intimate 
friends as Baldy Smith in contradistinc- 
tion from other officers of the same 
patronymic. In the old days his name 
would have been written Baldysmith. 

He was a brilliant and faithful student 
and became in turn a cadet-corporal, 
color-sergeant and lieutenant. When it 
is recalled that he received those honors 
from that prince of soldiers Captain 
(afterwards Major General) Charles F. 
Smith, then commandant of cadets, and 
in whose presence it is said no graduate 
of his time could ever appear without 
involuntarily assuming the position of a 
soldier, it will be understood that young 
Smith was brought up under proper in- 
fluences and sent forth with the highest 
ideals of his profession. He graduated 
in the "fives" of his class. He was com- 
missioned as a Brevet Second Lieutenant 
in the corps of Topographical Engineers, 
and served with it continuously till, for 



I 8 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 



convenience and simplicity of adminis- 
tration, it was merged with the Corps of 
Engineers after the outbreak of the Re- 
bellion. At the request of his chief, he 
gave up two-thirds of the usual gradu- 
ating leave of absence to lend a hand to 
an under-manned surveying party on 
Lake Erie. His services were from the 
first of the scientific and useful rather 
than the showy sort. They brought him 
a wide range of valuable experience, ex- 
tending from the surveys of the great 
lakes to explorations of Texas and Ari- 
zona, covering a period of seven years, 
two of which were spent under Joseph E. 
Johnston and William H. Emory, then 
of the same corps,while engaged in estab- 
lishing the new boundary line between 
Mexico and the United States. During 
his service in that region he located the 
stage and wagon-route from San Antonio 
to El Paso, surveyed a part of the Rio 
Grande Valley, and familiarized himself 
with the topography and resources of 
Northwestern Texas and the state of Chi- 
huahua in Mexico. Later he was trans- 
ferred to Florida and made surveys for a 
ship canal across the peninsula from the 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT I 9 



Atlantic to the Gulf of Mexico. Subse- 
quently he had charge of the Eleventh 
District in the light-house service with 
his headquarters at Detroit. He then 
became Assistant Secretary, and finally 
on the retirement of his friend, Captain 
Franklin, Engineer Secretary of the 
Light-House Board. He had previously 
asked for service with the army in Mex- 
ico, but this had been denied. His serv- 
ice in Texas and Florida had brought him 
in contact with a number of officers who 
afterwards became distinguished in the 
Civil War. Among the most notable 
of these were Buell, Joseph E. John- 
ston, McClellan, Meade, Burnside and 
Emory. His light-house service gave 
him a friendly association with Commo- 
dore Shubrick and Captain (afterwards 
Admiral) Jenkins of the navy, General 
Totten of the army, Professor Bache of 
the Coast survey and Professor Henry of 
the Smithsonian Institute, and opened to 
him a wide acquaintance with the scien- 
tific thought of the day. While con- 
nected with the Light-House board he 
planned and supervised the construc- 
tion of four first-class light-houses, one 



20 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

for Montauk Point, two for Navesink 
Highlands and Sandy Hook, and one 
for Cape Canaveral. These were all 
works of the highest class, fully abreast 
of the world's best practice at the time. 
His experience in connection with the 
Light-House Board prepared the way for 
a piece of specially useful service to the 
country during the exciting period just 
prior to the outbreak of actual hostilities 
between the North and the South. His 
position gave him access to the Secretary 
of the Treasury, as the chief of the de- 
partment to which the Light-House 
Board belonged. The storm then brewing 
showed itself in that board, made up, as 
it was, of Northern and Southern men, 
as well as elsewhere, and being intensely 
loyal, Smith took measures to protect 
and supply the principal light-houses on 
the southern coast. It will be remem- 
bered that Howell Cobb of Georgia was 
succeeded by General John A. Dix of 
New York as Secretary of the Treasury, 
and that the latter aroused the drooping 
hopes of the country by his celebrated 
order : " If any man attempts to haul 
down the American flag shoot him on 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 1 1 

the spot." Smith was privy to and 
encouraged the issuance of that order. 
Immediately afterwards General Dix 
gave him carte-blanche over the light- 
house service, in pursuance of which he 
visited all the important southern light 
stations, winding up at Key West. He 
found that place cut off from communi- 
cation with Washington, and liable to 
fall at once under the control of the Se- 
cessionists. The Collector of Customs 
was a southern man and disloyal. The 
people of the town were in sympathy 
with him, and were doing all they could 
to overawe Captains Hunt and Bran- 
nan, who were stationed there with a 
small force of regular artillery. They 
were loyal and able officers. Both rose 
to distinction afterwards, but having 
been left without instructions they were 
at a loss as to their proper course till 
Smith arrived with the latest news from 
Washington. His clear and determined 
counsel gave them heart and encourage- 
ment, under which they made good their 
hold upon the fort and the island. They 
were reinforced in due time, which en- 
abled the government to hold this im- 



22 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

portant strategic position at the entrance 
to the Gulf of Mexico till the termina- 
tion of the war put an end to all danger. 
Before returning to the north, Smith 
visited Havana, where he obtained valu- 
able information for future use. 

So far his work had been preparatory, 
and one of the most useful features of 
it was his tour of duty at West Point. 
His services in the south, and especially 
at Corpus Christi, had brought on a 
severe attack of malarial poisoning, end- 
ing in congestive chills and shattered 
health, followed by sick-leave and a 
return to the north. Before he had en- 
tirely recovered he was ordered to West 
Point, as principal Assistant Professor 
of Mathematics. This was in 1855, 
but his illness had so seriously affected 
his head as to make it impossible for him 
to discharge the duties of his position 
in a manner satisfactory to himself. As 
one of his pupils, I failed to discover 
any lack of knowledge or prespicacity on 
his part. To the contrary, he impressed 
the sections of which he had charge as a 
very clear-headed man with remark- 
able powers of mind and great aptitude 



1 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 1$ 

as a disciplinarian and teacher. It is 
now known, however, that the close 
attention and mental exertion which his 
duties required of him gave him such 
pain as to make it imperative that he 
should be relieved, and this was done at 
his own request after a year's hard work 
and suffering. The injury he had re- 
ceived was unfortunately never entirely 
overcome. Throughout the whole of 
his subsequent life he was subject to re- 
current attacks of malaria, accompanied 
by pain in the head with a tendency to 
mental depression, which disabled him 
entirely at times, and upon one most 
important occasion compelled him to 
leave the field, when his interests and his 
inclinations demanded that he should 
remain. I refer now especially to the 
time when he was assigned by General 
Grant to the command of the Army of 
the James, to succeed Major General But- 
ler, who was at the same time ordered to 
return to Fortress Monroe. It will be 
remembered that this order was never 
carried into effect, but that General 
Smith, who was suffering from one of his 
attacks, took leave of absence, much to 



24 GENERALWILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 



the concern of his friends, and went by 
the way of Fortress Monroe to New 
York. There was no great movement 
under way at the time, but before his 
leave of absence had expired he was no- 
tified that the order in question had been 
countermanded. Various explanations 
were given for this action, and I shall 
recur to it again. But it is believed by 
those who were interested in General 
Smith, and had confidence in his unu- 
sual capacity for high command, that his 
relief was largely, if not altogether, due to 
intrigue, on the part of General Butler, 
aided perhaps by an exaggerated esti- 
mate on the part of General Grant of 
that officer's political importance, which 
General Smith could easily have defeated 
had he been on the ground in actual 
command of the army to which he had 
been assigned. 

But to return to his services at West 
Point. It was during this year that he 
greatly widened his knowledged of mili- 
tary history and the art of war. Although 
far from well, he led the studious life of 
a scientist, and in the daily companion- 
ship of the professors and of Lieutenants 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 1$ 



Silvey and Holabird, two officers of dis- 
tinguished talent and learning, he obtain- 
ed new and broader views of professional 
subjects. He had early become noted as 
having an investigating mind which could 
not be satisfied with superficial know- 
ledge, and for a sound and conservative 
judgment which gave great weight to his 
conclusions. He was most deliberate and 
methodical in his habits of thought, and 
had an unusually tenacious grip upon the 
thread of his argument. His manners 
and movements, while free from every 
appearance of hurry and excitement, 
were habitually so well ordered that he 
was enabled to cover a great deal of 
ground in a small space of time. Always 
a close student of the higher branches 
of his profession, and belonging to an 
elite corps which at that time had no 
part in the command of troops, he be- 
came a proficient in military organization, 
administration and logistics, and also in 
strategy and grand-tactics, as taught in 
the text books, long before the outbreak 
of the war for the Union, but it is to be 
observed that he never claimed to have 
become specially skilled in minor tactics, 



26 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 



or in the daily routine of company or 
regimental service. He was, however, 
so profoundly devoted to the military 
profession in a larger way, that at times 
he gave to those less learned than him- 
self the idea that he was a pedant in 
knowledge and a martinet on duty. With 
imperturbable self-possession, great lu- 
cidity of statement and a decidedly delib- 
erate and austere manner, he was widely 
recognized as a masterful man, who won 
easily and without effort the respect 
and admiration, not only of the cadets 
who fell under his charge at West Point, 
but afterwards of the men and officers 
who came under his command from the 
volunteers. To such as are acquainted 
with West Point life, or with the rela- 
tions existing between officers and men 
in the army, no higher evidence can 
be given of Smith's real abilities and 
strength of character. It is a creditable 
fact that no cadet, however adroit or 
skilful can cheat his way through the 
Military Academy, and that no officer, 
however plausible, can for any consider- 
able time deceive or impose upon the 
cadets with a pretense of knowledge or 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 27 

a show of character which he does not 
possess. The same is true perhaps in a 
less degree ef the volunteers and their 
officers. Occasionally a cadet or an offi- 
cer may be so modest or unobtrusive or 
sd slow of development as to escape the 
critical observation of his associates, but 
in most cases he becomes sufficiently 
known to justify a correct estimate of 
his character and a fair prediction, under 
favorable opportunities, as to his prob- 
able course and success in life. Of 
William F. Smith it may be truthfully 
said that he made his best friends among 
the cadets he taught and the subordi- 
nates he commanded, not one of whom 
ever deserted him in trouble or adver- 
sity, denied the greatness of his talents 
or questioned the elevation of his char- 
acter. His troubles and differences were 
always with those above him, never with 
those under his command. 

As is frequently the fate of the strong 
man gifted with an analytical mind, and 
an outspoken contempt of pretense and 
sham, it was Smith's misfortune upon 
more than one occasion to arouse the 
animosity and opposition of those hav- 



28 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

ing higher rank than himself. Direct 
and vigorous in his methods, and con- 
fident of the rectitude of his purposes, 
he never hesitated to give his views to 
such as he believed to be entitled to 
them, without reference to whether they 
would be well received or not. Loyal 
and truthful by nature, he always held 
others to the high standard which he set 
up for himself. Brought up to a rigid 
observance of military discipline, it is 
not to be denied that he was exacting in 
a high degree, with those over whom he 
found himself in command. While he 
never permitted those below him to vary 
from or to disregard his instructions, it 
is perhaps true that like most men of 
talent, he was somewhat impatient of re- 
straint, especially in cases where he felt 
himself to be abler than his commanding 
officer, or better informed as to the actual 
conditions of his work, and yet no man 
knew better than he when the time for 
discussion and the exercise of discretion 
ended and that for obedience and vigor- 
ous action began. If at any time later 
in life he seemed to forget the true rule 
for his own guidance, it must be inferred 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 29 

that he was sorely tried by the ignorance 
or incompetency of those above him, 
or had overestimated their forebearance 
or friendship for him, or their zeal for 
the public service. Always highly con- 
scientious in his purposes and independ- 
ent in his thoughts it was but natural 
that he should scorn "to crook the preg- 
nant hinges of the knee where thrift 
may follow fawning." Not always as 
patient and conciliatory with his equals 
as a less virile or rugged nature would 
have made him, he occasionally aroused 
antagonisms and made enemies, as such 
characters always do, and those enemies 
were not slow to impugn his motives, 
nor to do what they could to mar his 
career. Withal, it will appear from a 
careful study of his life and services as 
set forth in the records, and as explained 
by his own writings, that his critics have 
signally failed to mar the foundation of 
his reputation or to deprive him of the 
fame to which his brilliant achievements 
so justly entitle him. 

The culmination of the political agi- 
tation for the dissolution of the Federal 
Union, and the commencement of actual 



3<D GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

hostilities between the government and 
the seceding states, found William F. 
Smith, only a captain by law, after four- 
teen years of continuous service, a few 
months over thirty-seven years of age, 
and in the full maturity of his faculties. 
As before stated, his health was never 
afterwards altogether stable, but it was 
sufficiently re-established to enable him 
to throw himself heartily into the strug- 
gle and to perform such duties as fell to 
his lot with a fair degree of endurance. 
Although a Democrat, as far as he had 
any party connection, his sympathies 
were all with the Union and National 
Government, and impelled him to lose 
no time, but make haste, on his return 
from Key West and Havana, to obtain 
such employment as might be open to 
him. The first duty that was offered 
him was in New York, where he was en- 
gaged for several weeks in mustering the 
volunteers into the United States service. 
During this period, on the 24th of 
April, 1 861, he was married to Miss 
Sarah Lyon, a young lady of New York, 
who was famous for the lovliness of her 
person and character, whom he had first 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 3 I 

met two years before. It was on a short 
wedding trip to his native state that he 
offered his services to the Governor. 
The latter had already raised and organ- 
ized two regiments of infantry but with- 
out hesitation he promised Captain 
Smith the next, as soon as it should be 
called for. 

Meanwhile he was still subject to 
duty as an engineer officer, and as such, 
strangely enough was ordered to report 
to Major General Benjamin F. Butler, 
fresh from the life of a successful lawyer, 
then in command at Fortress Monroe, 
where he arrived on the ist of June,i86i. 
While there he conducted several im- 
portant reconnoissances in the direction 
of Yorktown and Big Bethel, and thus 
became acquainted with a region in 
which he was afterwards to play a most 
important part. His services lasted 
something less than two months, and 
became still more notable from the fact 
that they made him thoroughly ac- 
quainted with General Butler. They 
were brought suddenly to an end by the 
reappearance of his old trouble, which 
in time made it necessary for him to 



32 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

take a sick-leave. The surgeon who 
had him in charge directed him to again 
seek the tonic climate of Brattleborough 
in his native State. According to pro- 
mise, his good friend, the Governor, 
took the earliest opportunity to send him 
his commission as Colonel of the Third 
Regiment of Vermont Volunteer In- 
fantry, to date from July 16th. But 
owing to the scarcity of regular officers, 
he had previously been ordered to duty 
on the staff of General McDowell, then 
commanding the army in front of Wash- 
ington, though, his health did not per- 
mit him to join in time to take part in 
the forward movement which ended in 
the disastrous battle of Bull Run. 

As soon however as his strength was 
sufficiently re-established Colonel Smith 
repaired to Washington, and in the rush 
and excitement which prevailed after the 
return of the defeated army to that 
neighborhood, he was engaged in help- 
ing to fortify and defend that city till the 
danger was past and the requirements 
of his regiment made it necessary for 
him to take command and begin its pre- 
paration for active service. It is to be 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 33 

noted that there was an unaccountable 
reluctance on the part of the War De- 
partment at the time, to permit the de- 
tachment of officers belonging to the 
various staff corps, for the purpose of 
commanding volunteers, but this was 
overcome without much difficulty in 
his case, and he began his career as an 
infantry colonel opportunely at the very 
time that McClellan was re-organizing 
the defeated army and badly needed the 
assistance of educated officers. Deeply 
impressed with the importance of stim- 
ulating the pride of the volunteers, and 
of keeping alive the heroic traditions of 
their state by all proper means, Colonel 
Smith recommended that the Vermont 
regiments should be brigaded and trained 
together, and fortunately this was ap- 
proved by General McClellan. The 
Green Mountain men had won great 
renown in the Colonial and Revolu- 
tionary Wars by virtue of their state 
organization and services and the marked 
individuality which characterized them. 
It was a happy thought to keep them 
together during the Civil War. The 
sequel showed that it was not only highly 



34 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

beneficial to the national cause, but that 
it added greatly to the fame of the Ver- 
mont men. 

As the war was a sectional one in its 
origin, many of our best officers believed 
that the volunteer regiments should be 
formed into brigades and divisions, with- 
out reference to the States from which 
they came. They held that an army or- 
ganized in this way would more rapidly 
develop the national spirit and become 
a more efficient military machine than 
one formed on state or sectional lines, 
and the general practice to the end of 
the war, in the Union army, was in ac- 
cordance with this idea. 

The Vermont brigade, composed of 
the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and 
Sixth Vermont Regiments, was the one 
notable exception to this practice and the 
result was in every way satisfactory. It 
preserved its identity till the end of the 
war and became famous as one of the 
best and most distinctive organizations 
that ever upheld the Union cause. It 
was composed almost entirely of native 
Vermont men, racy of the soil, hardy, 
self-reliant and courageous, and always 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 3 5 

ready for the serious business of warfare. 
It owned its early and enduring discipline 
to Smith, who was appointed Brigadier 
General on the 13 th of August, and from 
that time forth it never ceased to have a 
place in his affections. From the first 
he took a special pride in his regiment, 
and devoted himself earnestly to its in- 
struction and discipline, for the perfec- 
tion of which it soon became noted, but 
in those days of rapid changes, when the 
loyal states were sending forth their vol- 
unteers by the hundred thousand, bri- 
gades soon grew into divisions, and di- 
visions into army-corps and armies. 

General Smith was then at exactly the 
right age, and had already achieved such 
a high reputation as a scientific and com- 
petent soldier, that he was called upon 
after only a few weeks' service as a 
brigade commander to take charge of 
a division of three brigades. Looking 
about him with anxious care for a suit- 
able successor, he assigned the Vermont 
Brigade to the command of Brigadier 
General William T. H. Brooks, a grad- 
uate of West Point from Ohio, but a 
grandson of Vermont. He was a vet- 



^6 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

eran of the Mexican and Indian Wars, 
in which he had gained great experience, 
and from which he became justly famous 
as one of the finest soldiers of his time. 
A man of striking countenance, great 
physical vigor and dauntless courage, he 
was an ideal leader of the Vermont men 
and at once won their confidence and re- 
spect. It is one of the traditions of the 
times that under him "The Iron Bri- 
gade," as it soon came to be known 
throughout the army, was never repulsed 
and never failed to accomplish the task 
before it. Its "skirmish line" was be- 
lieved to be "stronger than an old- 
fashioned line of battle," and when it 
covered the advance, the column behind 
it had to put forth its best efforts to keep 
up. From the brigadier general to the 
lowest private, they not only knew their 
business, but just when they should be 
called upon to take the lead. It was 
one of the grizzled privates during the 
pursuit of Lee from the field of Gettys- 
burg, who perceiving that the cavalry 
was making but poor progress, said from 
the ranks as General Sedgwick was 
passing: " I 'low you want to get to 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 37 

Williamsport tonight, don't you, Uncle 
John ?" " Yes, my man," said the Gen- 
eral. "Well, in that case you had better 
put the Vermont brigade to the front!" 
The suggestion was at once adopted, 
and under the sturdy advance which fol- 
lowed the desired camp was reached that 
night without a check or a halt by the 
way. 

The other two brigades of Smith's 
division were commanded, respectively, 
by Windfield Scott Hancock and Isaac 
I. Stevens, two soldiers of the highest 
quality, and both destined to achieve 
undying fame. When their subsequent 
career is considered it may well be 
doubted if there was ever a division in 
the Union army commanded by abler 
men than Hancock, Stevens, Brooks 
and Baldy Smith. During the forma- 
tive period of the Army of the Poto- 
mac, when all were drilling, all studying 
tactics, all teaching guard duty and all 
striving hard to establish a satisfactory 
state of military dicipline, Smith varied 
this irksome work by an occasional re- 
view, or by the still more exciting exer- 
cise of a reconnoissance in force, thus 



38 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

adding practice to precept, and bringing 
regiments and brigades to act coherently 
together. In all this he handled his di- 
vision skillfully and well, and conse- 
quently soon had the satisfaction of 
showing those in authority over him 
that it was in admirable spirits and con- 
dition. 

How far he favored the policy of 
delay for the purpose of increasing the 
army's strength and perfecting its organi- 
zation is not certainly known, but it must 
be admitted on his own testimony that 
he belonged to the coterie of officers who 
fully trusted and supported McClellan 
in the determination to make complete 
preparation before moving against the 
enemy. Nor is it known what part he 
took in the selection of the line of ope- 
rations ultimately adopted by McClellan 
for the capture of Richmond. Perhaps 
this is not important, for neither the 
duty nor the responsibility of the choice 
was his. It is not likely, however, that 
he was consulted for his acquaintance 
with McClellan was not at first close or 
intimate. At a later period he joined 
his friend General Franklin, then gener- 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 39 

ally acknowledged as one of the leading 
military men of the day, in a letter to 
the President recommending the trans- 
fer of the Army of the Potomac from 
the vicinity of Fredericksburg to the 
James River, as near to Richmond as 
practicable, and urging its re-inforcement 
by all the troops that could be gathered 
from the departments of the Atlantic 
seaboard. Without discussing here the 
origin or the wisdom of this contro- 
verted proposition, it may be remarked 
that it was supported by such an array 
of arguments and influence as would 
doubtless have secured another trial for 
it, even in the face of its failure under 
McClellan, had the condition and 
strength of the army, and the resources 
of the country been considered by the 
administration sufficient to meet all the 
requirements of the civil and military 
situation. 

At a still later period after General 
Grant had come to the head of military 
affairs, had decided to take personal 
charge of operations in Virginia, and 
was seriously considering the appoint- 
ment of General Smith to the immedi- 



40 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

ate command of the Army of the Poto- 
mac, it became known to me, through 
a letter from the latter, that he strongly 
favored a "powerful movement from the 
lower James River, or even from the 
sounds of North Carolina" against the 
interior of the Confederacy. I was at 
that time serving in Washington, as the 
Chief of the Cavalry Bureau, and upon 
receipt of the letter laid it before General 
Rawlins, Grant's able Chief of Staff, but 
without giving it my concurrence or ap- 
proval, for such consideration as he might 
think best to give it. It was received at 
a juncture when the selection of a proper 
plan of operations was conceded to be 
a matter of the gravest importance. It 
is an interesting fact that the plan in 
question did not receive the support of 
Rawlins, although both he and Grant, 
fresh from the victory of Chattanooga, 
were warm friends and admirers of Gen- 
eral Smith as a strategist. Rawlins, with 
unerring instinct, took strong grounds 
against it, for the reason, as he vigorously 
expressed it, that he could not see the 
sense of going so far, and taking so much 
time to find Lee with a divided army, 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 4I 

when he could be reached within a half 
day's march directly to the front, with 
the entire army united and reinforced by 
all the men the goverment had at its dis- 
posal. Knowing that this was Grant's 
argument as well, I have always supposed 
that his final decision to advance directly 
from Culpepper Court House against 
Lee's army, and to retain Meade in im- 
mediate command of the Army of the 
Potomac, while the entire available force 
of Butler's Deparment should advance 
directly from Fort Monroe under the 
immediate command of General Smith, 
was due partly to Smith's decided op- 
position to the overland line of opera- 
tions, and to his tenacious adherence to 
the principal features of the plan which 
he and Franklin had recommended to 
Lincoln. Meade's approval of the direct 
line of advance, and his cheerful support 
of Grant's plans as explained in detail, 
aided by Butler's assurances of hearty 
co-operation, doubtless had much to do 
with the retention of those officers in 
their respective places, and in the assign- 
ment of Smith, much to his disappoint- 
ment, to a relatively subordinate posi- 



42 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

tion on the line he had so openly pre- 
ferred. It may also account in some de- 
gree for the failure of those distinguished 
generals to work as harmoniously with 
each other to the common end, as was 
necessary to ensure success. 

Before following this interesting sub- 
ject to its conclusion, the part actually 
played by General Smith in McClellan's 
Peninsular Campaign should be briefly 
recounted. After the Army of the Po- 
tomac had been transferred to the lower 
Chesapeake, by water, instead of landing 
at Urbana or on the estuary of the Rap- 
pahannock, as was at first intended, out 
of fear of the Merrimac, which had 
played such havoc with the wooden fri- 
gates of Goldborough's fleet, in Hamp- 
ton Roads, it was disembarked at Fort- 
ress Monroe. It necessarily lost some 
time here before it could be reunited 
and begin its march up the Peninsula. 
It had hardly got well under way, when 
much to the disappointment of the 
country it found itself stopped for thirty 
days, by an insignificant stream and a 
weak line of entrenchments held by a 
few guns and a single division of Con- 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 43 

federate Infantry, under the command 
of General Magruder. 

The so-called " Siege of Yorktown" 
followed, and General Smith, chafing at 
the delay which he conceived to be 
unnecessary set about studying the sit- 
uation in his own front, with the keen 
eye of an experienced engineer. Hav- 
ing the year before familiarized himself 
with the lay of the land near Fort 
Monroe, he was quick to grasp every 
condition which favored an advance. A 
careful reconnoissance of his immediate 
front enabled him to surprise a crossing 
of Warwick River and to carry a section 
of the fortified line beyond. This as 
might have been expected was done by 
a detachment of the Vermont Brigade, 
which made a gallant effort to maintain 
the lodgement it had gained, but as it 
was not supported by McClellan, it was 
withdrawn after suffering a loss of 165 
men killed, wounded and missing. This 
was the first engagement in a campaign 
destined to cost the lives of many brave 
men and to end in a terrible disaster to 
the national arms. 

After making a heroic stand and hold- 



44 GENERAL WILLIAM PARRAR SMITH 

ing McClellan and his overwhelming 
force at bay for nearly a month, Magru- 
der abandoned his lines and fell back to 
Williamsburgh on the road up the Pen- 
insula to Richmond. He was slowly 
followed by McClellan's army. Smith's 
divison having crossed the Warwick at 
Lee's mill, led in the pursuit, coming 
up with the enemy strongly posted in a 
new line of fortifications covering the 
town of Williamsburg. Smith's engi- 
neering skill and his quick intelligence 
served him again most fortunately, and 
with the aid of Captain West of the 
Coast Survey then serving on his staff, 
soon enabled him to find the weak spot 
in the enemy's position. This time it 
turned out to be on the extreme left, 
where he had failed, probably through 
lack of troops, to occupy the extensive 
works which had been previously con- 
structed. Realizing intuitively the fu- 
tility of a front attack against such 
entrenchments, Smith threw Hancock's 
brigade promptly to the right and under 
cover of the woods, succeeded without 
serious loss or delay in occupying one 
of the works from which, with his divi- 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 45 

sion he could easily have swept the whole 
line had he not been restrained by the 
presence of his seniors. 

Unfortunately McClellan was in the 
rear, but Sumner and Heintzelman, 
corps commanders, were soon upon the 
ground, and with prudent but ill-timed 
conservatism declined to sanction the 
proper movement to reinforce Hancock, 
for fear that it would bring on a general 
engagement before the army could be 
properly closed up and placed in posi- 
tion to participate. Smith recognizing, 
the great advantage certain to arise from 
pushing promptly through the opening 
he had already found, besought Sumner 
for permission to go with the rest of his 
division to Hancock's assistance, but 
this was also denied. As other troops 
arrived on the field, Smith moved to the 
right to make place for them, with the 
hope that he might be permitted to con- 
tinue his march unobserved till he had 
come up with his advanced brigade, but 
orders were sent which arrested him be- 
fore he had accomplished the object he 
had in view. All day long he was held 
in the leash with certain victory in sight. 



46 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 



McClellan arrived on the field late in 
the afternoon, but before he could get a 
satisfactory understanding of the condi- 
tion of affairs, night came on. Conse- 
quently nothing decisive was done that 
day and a great opportunity was lost. 
The wily Magruder, seeing that his left 
had been turned, and that his position 
was untenable, abandoned his works 
under cover of darkness and fell back 
towards Richmond. Obviously this re- 
sult was due, first, to the fortunate dis- 
covery made by General Smith and his 
engineer, and to the successful turning 
movement of Hancock, based thereon; 
and, second, to the certainty that if pro- 
perly reinforced by the rest of Smith's 
division, and by other divisions, if nec- 
essary, as it surely would be as soon as 
the national commander had come to 
comprehend the real condition of affairs, 
the Confederate forces would be taken 
in flank and rear and overwhelmed. 

This was Smith's last chance at any- 
thing like independent action. During 
the remainder of this ill-starred cam- 
paign he played the part of a subordin- 
ate division commander, in a large army 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 47 

engaged in a complicated series of move- 
ments and battles, and of course had no 
control over the general plans or oper- 
ations. There is no evidence that he 
was ever consulted by anyone except his 
corps commander Franklin who was 
himself also a subordinate. The army 
lacking field experience, did not work 
well together as a whole. The corps 
commanders had been selected and ap- 
pointed by the Secretary of War, with- 
out reference to McClellan's wishes or 
recommendations. Several of them 
were veterans, who received their assign- 
ments because of seniority rather than 
for special aptitudes, and this naturally 
begot a disposition on the part of the 
division commanders,who were generally 
younger and perhaps more ambitious 
men, to look carefully after their own 
troops and leave larger affairs to their 
seniors. At all events, Smith's principal 
care henceforth was to handle his own 
division and look out exclusively for its 
requirements, and this he did prudently 
and well, especially during the Seven 
days' battle, and during the change of 
base from the York to the James River. 



48 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

His brigades, led as I have pointed out, 
by very able men, were more or less 
constantly and successfully engaged. 
They took a most creditable part in the 
battles of Golding's Farm, Savage Sta- 
tion and White Oak Swamp. 

Throughout the whole of this trying 
time of incessant marching and fighting 
Smith remained w T atchful and wary, di- 
recting his division through every peril, 
and finally conducting it, without mate- 
rial loss, but with increased confidence 
in itself and in its leader, to the new 
base which had been selected for the 
army. His cool and confident bearing, 
and his skillful conduct throughout this 
campaign, won for him the brevet of 
Lieutenant Colonel in the regular army 
and the rank of Major General of Vol- 
unteers. 

It was during the night march from 
Malvern Hill that General Smith en- 
countered General Fitz-John Porter, his 
class-mate whom he always regarded as 
a first-class soldier, and with whom upon 
this occasion he had a conversation, the 
facts of which go far to justify this high 
estimate. Noting that Porter seemed 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 49 

greatly depressed he asked what was the 
matter. In reply, Porter told him that 
as soon as he had become certain the 
evening before that the enemy had been 
broken and beaten back from his reck- 
less attack on the Union lines at Mal- 
vern Hill, and had withdrawn in dis- 
order from the field, he had gone to 
McClellan on board the boat which he 
had occupied with his headquarters, and 
had begged him with all the arguments 
he could bring to bear, and all the force 
he could command, to assume the offen- 
sive at dawn. He said he had spent 
half the night in advocacy of this policy, 
expressing the confident belief that if 
adopted it would result, not only in the 
destruction of Lee's army, but in the 
capture of Richmond. He had no 
doubt that our own army, encouraged 
by the sanguinary repulse it had finally 
inflicted upon the enemy, would respond 
to every demand which could be made 
upon it, and would thus turn a series 
of indecisive combats, which the country 
would surely regard as defeats, into a 
magnificent victory. Smith's testimony 
shows this splendid conception to have 



$0 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

been no afterthought with Porter, as it 
was with many who subsequently came 
to understand the facts of the case, but 
coming as it did hot from a desperate 
battle field, must be regarded as the in- 
spiration of true military genius, while 
the fact that McClellan rejected it must 
always be considered as the best possi- 
ble evidence of his unreadiness to meet 
great emergencies. * Smith does not say 
specifically that he approved it, but 
the context of his narrative leaves but 
little doubt that he thought favorably 
of it and would have given it hearty 
support. 

In the withdrawal of the Army of the 
Potomac from the Peninsula, and its 
transfer to Washington, as ordered by 
Halleck and the Secretary of War, 
Smith and his division necessarily played 
a subordinate part. With the rest of the 
army they formed a tardy junction with 
Pope in front of Washington, and did 
theirshare towards making the capital safe 
and unassailable, but they were not again 
engaged till they met the enemy in the 
bloody and successful action at Cramp- 
ton's Gap, in the South Mountain. The 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 5 I 

division also took part three days later 
in the battle of Antietam, but notwith- 
standing McClellan's claim that the bat- 
tle was a " master piece of art," neither 
Smith's troops, nor the corps to which 
they belonged, were seriously engaged. 
This was not the fault of either Franklin 
or Smith, both of whom were greatly 
displeased with the disjointed and irres- 
olute manner in which the Union forces 
were handled and the battle was fought. 
The most that can be said is that both 
General Smith and his division did all 
that was asked of them, not only in the 
battle of Antietam, but in following Lee's 
army back to Virginia. These opera- 
tions are now justly regarded as reflect- 
ing but little credit on the generalship 
by which the national army was con- 
trolled during that period of its history. 
While they ended McClellan's military 
career, they afforded but little chance 
for any of his subordinates to gain dis- 
tinction, and those who escaped respon- 
sibility for supporting his policy of 
delay had good reasons to regard them- 
selves as fortunate. 

The withdrawal of McClellan and the 



$2 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

accession of the weak and vacillating 
Burnside to command was followed by 
a re-arrangement of the Army of the 
Potomac into three grand divisions, 
and a re-assignment of leading generals. 
Franklin was placed in command of the 
Third Grand Division, consisting of the 
First Corps under General Reynolds, 
and the Sixth Corps under General 
Smith. In the abortive Fredericksburg 
campaign which followed, these corps 
had the extreme left of the Union line, 
but it should have been evident from 
the start that with the opposing armies 
separated by a broad river occupying a 
deep valley, from three-quarters of a mile 
to a mile and a half between the opposite 
crests, the movement which was to bring 
on the battle must necessarily be fought 
under extraordinary disadvantages to the 
attacking army. In the mind of those 
who were to carry out the details of the 
movements, success must have seemed 
hopeless from the first. Burnside was 
from the beginning of the campaign 
overcome by the weight of his respon- 
sibilities, and between tears at one time 
and lack of sleep at another, his fatuous 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT $% 

mind failed to evolve for itself, or to ac- 
cept from others a definite and compre- 
hensive plan of operations. He seemed 
at successive times to have had hopes of 
surprising Lee, of breaking his center 
and overwhelming his left, of seizing 
two important points in his main line 
of defence and completely turning his 
left, but withal it is certain that he gave 
to none of these operations sufficient 
attention to justify the slightest hope 
that it could be successfully carried into 
effect. 

On the other hand, Lee was on the 
alert with his army of 78,000 men, well 
and compactly posted in a commanding 
and almost impregnable position along 
the wooded heights which overlooked 
Fredericksburg and the valley of the 
Rappahannock from the south. Burn- 
side had 113,000 men of all arms, well 
supplied and thoroughly organized, com- 
manded by the ablest generals in the 
service. His preponderance of force 
was therefore close to fifty per cent., but 
unfortunately that was not enough to 
outweigh the natural and artificial obsta- 
cles, the heights, stone walls, entrench- 



54 



GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 



ments, open fields and river to be over- 
come by the advancing army. The task 
was a hopeless one from the start, and 
to make matters worse, Burnside, who at 
best had but a vague and uncertain com- 
prehension of the work before him, seems 
to have lost what little head he was en- 
dowed with before his operations were 
fully under way. 

The result was unfortunate in the 
extreme. Two Grand Divisions suc- 
ceeded in crossing the river without 
material opposition, but at once found 
themselves confronted by difficulties and 
forces they could not overcome. Frank- 
lin, in compliance with his instructions, 
took two days to get into position, but 
when his two corps had reached the 
place assigned them on the old Rich- 
mond Road, with the aid of Smith and 
Reynolds, he looked over the ground 
and made up his mind that the only 
chance of victory was offered by an 
assault upon the enemy's right center, 
with the full force of his two corps, 
amounting to 40,000 men. Burnside, 
at his invitation, came to that part of the 
field, and after listening to the views 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 55 

of the three generals, either of whom 
was vastly his superior as a soldier, ap- 
proved the plan and promised to give a 
written order for its execution. Franklin 
waited all night for the order, telegraphed 
twice, and finally sent a staff officer for 
it, but it never came. Indeed it was 
never issued but a different order di- 
recting him to seize the heights at 
Hamilton's House, nearly three miles 
from his right division, and to keep the 
whole of his command in readiness to 
move at once, was sent instead. Sumner 
received an order equally inane, in refer- 
ence to Marye's Heights. The result- 
ing operations which should have been 
carefully co-ordinated and vigorously 
supported, were weak and indecisive. 
As the day wore away Lee took advan- 
tage of the delays and the opportunities 
which they offered him, and assumed 
the offensive. There was much severe 
but desultory and disconnected fighting. 
The Union generals with their officers 
and men did their best, but Burnside 
was on the opposite side of the river and 
could neither give intelligent orders nor 
act promptly upon the suggestions which 



56 GENERAL WTLLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

were sent to him from the field. There 
was no chance for maneuvering. It was 
from the first head-on, face-to-face fight- 
ing with no hope of victory for the as- 
sailants. The Union losses were over 
12,500 men killed, wounded and miss- 
ing, of which 4,962 belonged to Frank- 
lin's Grand Division, while Jackson's 
corps which confronted him lost 5,364. 

A full description of this mid-winter 
campaign would be out of place in this 
sketch, and the same may be said of the 
abortive Mud Campaign six weeks later, 
which had for its object the passage of the 
Rappahannock by a movement above 
Fredericksburg. Both Franklin and 
Smith took part in this ill planned and 
poorly executed undertaking. The 
weather and the roads were against it, 
and it soon came to an end quite as pit- 
iful, though not so costly, as its prede- 
cessor. 

Following these failures, Burnside, in 
futile desperation, prepared an order 
relieving Franklin, Smith and several 
other officers of inferior rank from duty, 
and dismissing Hooker, Brooks, New- 
ton and Cochrane from the service. He 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 57 

made no further charge against these 
officers than that they had no confidence 
in himself, and this much was probably 
true, but it would have been equally as 
true of any other generals serving at that 
time in the Army of the Potomac. The 
President, instead of approving the or- 
der, it should be noted, at once relieved 
Burnside and assigned Hooker to the 
command. Sumner and Franklin both 
of whom outranked Hooker were re- 
lieved from further service with that 
army, while Smith was transferred to the 
command of the Ninth Corps, which 
he held but a short time, owing to the 
failure of the Senate to confirm him as 
a major general. This was doubtless 
brought about by misrepresentation, 
made to the Senate committee on the 
Conduct of the War, but as the action 
of the Senate and its committees in ref- 
erence to confirmations were secret, no 
correct explanation can now be given of 
the allegations against Smith, though 
they were generally attributed at the 
time to Burnside and his friends, and 
while they were neither properly inves- 
tigated nor supported, they resulted in 



58 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

reducing Smith to the rank of brigadier 
general and depriving him of the high 
command which he would have other- 
wise continued to hold. 

It is worthy of note that before these 
changes were made, and while the Army 
of the Potomac was still floundering in 
the mud under the inefficient command 
of Burnside, Franklin and Smith joined 
in the letter previously referred to, 
advising the President to abandon the 
line on which the Army was then ope- 
rating, with such ill success, and after 
reinforcing it to the fullest extent, to 
send it back again to the line of the 
James River. This letter was doubtless 
written in entire good faith, but at a time 
when it seemed to be impossible for the 
government, even if it had so desired, 
to carry out its recommendations. Its 
only immediate effect was to arouse the 
antagonism of Mr. Stanton against these 
two able officers, and to deprive the 
country for a while of their services. A 
wiser and more temperate Secretary of 
War would have filed and ignored it, or 
sent for the officers and explained why 
he deemed their advice to be impracti- 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 59 

cable at that time. That, however, was 
not Mr. Stanton's way. Although in- 
tensely patriotic and in earnest, he was 
imperious and overbearing both to high 
and low alike, and preferred to banish 
and offend rather than to listen and 
conciliate. 

The winter of 1862-3 * s now by com- 
mon consent regarded as the darkest 
period of the war for the Union. The 
failure of Burnside's plans and the defeat 
of Hooker at Chancellorsville severely 
tried the discipline and organization of 
the Army of the Potomac, and filled the 
loyal North with alarm, while it corre- 
spondingly encouraged the Confederate 
government and raised the confidence of 
its army. As soon as the winter was over 
and the roads were settled Lee assumed 
the initiative, drove Hooker back from 
the Rappahannock, crossed the Poto- 
mac, advanced confidently to Chambers- 
burg and pushed his cavalry as far north 
as Harrisburg and York. 

Hooker had also proven himself to 
be incompetent, and desperate as the 
measure was, the Washington govern- 
ment relieved him in the midst of an 



60 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

active campaign, and entrusted the army 
and its fortunes to the direction of Major 
General George G. Meade, a gallant and 
able soldier, who checked the high tide 
of rebellion at Gettysburg on the 2nd 
and 3rd of July, 1863. During this 
campaign Smith, who was on leave of 
absence when it began, made haste to 
offer his services, without conditions, and 
was at once sent to Harrisburg to assist 
Major General Couch, who had been 
assigned to the command of the Penn- 
sylvania and New York militia. Taking 
command of an improvised division, 
he moved against the enemy, then 
threatening Carlisle, with all the assur- 
ance of a veteran, and while the prompt 
retreat of the enemy prevented any 
severe engagement, the movement was 
entirely efficacious. With the true in- 
stincts of a soldier he pressed on in the 
direction of the Confederate army, and 
took part in its pursuit from Gettysburg 
back to Virginia. Curiously enough, 
instead of commending and thanking 
him and his raw troops for their gallant 
services, the Secretary of War ordered 
his arrest for taking his command be- 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 6 I 

yond the limits of Pennsylvania, for the 
special defence of which the militia had 
been called out, but fortunately the re- 
monstrance of General Couch caused this 
order to be recalled, and the gallant but 
unappreciated general again withdrew 
from the field, as soon as the scare was 
over and his forces were permitted to 
return to their homes. 

It will be remembered that the news 
of Lee's defeat and his retreat from 
Gettysburg reached the country on the 
4th of July, and that the same day was 
made triply memorable by the capture 
of Vicksburg with Pemberton's entire 
army of 30,000 men with all their guns 
and ammunitions. These two striking 
events threw the country into the wildest 
enthusiasm. Even the most despond- 
ent now became confident that the 
Southern Confederacy would soon be 
destroyed, and that the triumphant 
Union would be finally re-established. 
But this confidence was destined to be 
rudely shaken. 

Later in the summer, taking advant- 
age of the lull in operations elsewhere, 
the Confederate leaders sent Longstreet's 



6l GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

splendid corps of veterans from Vir- 
ginia, and that part of Johnston's army 
which had been paroled, together with 
such detachments as could be got from 
Alabama, to reinforce Bragg, who had 
been driven by Rosecrans from Middle 
Tennessee to Northern Georgia. Turn- 
ing fiercely upon his over-confident pur- 
suer, as soon as his reinforements were at 
hand, Bragg struck a staggering blow at 
Chickamauga, which not only came near 
giving Chattanooga back to him, but 
filled the northern states with consterna- 
tion. The war was not only not ended, 
but had burst forth with renewed vigor. 
Reinforcements in large numbers were 
hurried forward from all parts of the 
country to Chattanooga. Hooker, with 
Howard's and Slocum's corps, was sent 
out by rail from Virginia, while the 
greater part of Grant's Army of the 
Tennessee was withdrawn from the lower 
Mississippi, where it was resting after 
the capture of Vicksburg, and marched 
over-land from Memphis to the same 
place. The separate departments in the 
Mississippi Valley were consolidated 
into a military grand division, under the 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 6% 



supreme command of General Grant, 
and what turned out to be of almost 
equal importance was the fact that Brig- 
adier General William F. Smith was 
relieved from service in West Virginia, 
where he had been recently assigned to 
duty, and sent to contribute his part 
towards strengthening the national grasp 
upon the vast region of which Chatta- 
nooga was justly considered the strategic 
center. 

Whatever the government at that 
time may have thought of him as a com- 
mander of troops, it is certain that it 
was willing to recognize and use his ex- 
perience and marked intellectual resour- 
ces as an engineer officer to their fullest 
extent. As it turned out, it could not 
have paid him a greater compliment, nor 
given him a better opportunity for dis- 
tinction. His fame had gone before 
him, and on his arrival at Chattanooga, 
although he preferred the command of 
troops, he was assigned at once to duty 
as Chief Engineer of the Department 
and Army of the Cumberland. For- 
tunately this gave him the control, not 
only of the engineer troops and mate- 



64 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

rials, and the engineer operations of that 
army, but carried with it the right and 
duty of knowing the army's condition 
and requirements as well as all the plans 
which might be considered for extricat- 
ing it from the extraordinary perils and 
difficulties which surrounded it. 

Although efforts have been made at 
various times and by various writers, to 
minimize these perils and difficulties, it 
cannot be denied that the situation of 
that army was at that epoch an exceed- 
ingly grave one. It had been rudely 
checked, if not completely beaten, in 
one of the most desperate and bloody 
battles of the war, and shut up in Chat- 
tanooga by Bragg's army on the south, 
and by an almost impassable mountain 
region on the north and west. Its com- 
munication by rail with its secondary 
base at Bridgeport, and with its primary 
base at Nashville, had been broken by 
the Confederate cavalry and rendered 
most uncertain. Its supplies were scanty 
and growing daily less, while its artillery 
horses and draft mules were dying by 
hundreds, for lack of forage. The only 
safe wagon roads to the rear were by a 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 6$ 

long and circuitous route through the 
mountains north of the Tennessee River, 
which was besides so rough and muddy 
that the teams could haul hardly enough 
for their own subsistence, much less an 
adequate supply for the troops. 

All the contemporary accounts go to 
show that Rosecrans, while personally 
brave enough, was himself more or less 
confused and excited by the great disaster 
which had overtaken his army at Chick- 
amauga. H e had been cut off and greatly 
shaken by the overthrow of his right 
wing, and consequently retired with it 
to Chattanooga. Notwithstanding this 
unfortunate withdrawal and his failure to 
rejoin the organized portion of his army, 
which under General George H.Thomas, 
held on firmly to its position against 
every attack, those who knew Rosecrans 
best still believed him to be a most loyal 
and gallant gentleman who was anxious 
and willing to do all that could be done 
to save his army and maintain its ad- 
vanced position. But there is no satis- 
factory evidence that up to the time he 
turned over his command to his succes- 
sor, he had formed any adequate or com- 



66 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

prehensive plan for supplying it or 
getting it ready to resume the offensive. 
Every general in it knew that it needed 
and must have supplies, and that the 
only way to get them, without falling 
back, was to open and keep open the 
direct road or "cracker line" to Bridge- 
port. But how and when this was to 
be done was the great question. 

Much has been written upon this sub- 
ject; a military commission has had it 
under consideration ; the records have 
been consulted; a report has been made, 
and comments upon it have been issued 
by General Smith and his friends. Even 
the late Secretary of War, Elihu Root, 
has passed judgment upon it, and yet it 
can be safely said that nothing has been 
done to disturb the conclusion reached 
at the time, that General Smith in con- 
sultation with his superiors worked out 
the plan as to how, when and by what 
means the short supply line by the way 
of Brown's Ferry and the Lookout Val- 
ley should be opened and maintained. 
He certainly secured its adoption first 
by Thomas and afterwards by Grant, and 
finally when he had arranged all the 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 6j 

details of the complicated and delicate 
operations, and had prepared all engi- 
neer's materials and pontoons which 
were required, he personally commanded 
the troops and carried that part of the 
plan which was based on Chattanooga, 
to a successful conclusion. 

When it is remembered that Rose- 
crans had left Chattanooga, that he had 
been succeeded by Thomas, and that 
Grant himself had arrived on the ground 
and assumed supreme command, before 
the first practical step had been taken to 
carry the plan into effect, and that the 
plan itself involved a descent and pass- 
age of the Tennessee River by night, 
the defeat and capture of the enemy's 
outposts, the laying of a pontoon bridge 
across a broad and rapid river, the re- 
building of the railroad, and its main- 
tenance within easy reach of the enemy's 
front for twenty-five miles, and that all 
of this was done without the slightest 
mishap and with but little loss, and that 
it resulted in relieving the army from 
want and in putting it in condition to re- 
sume the offensive as soon as its rein- 
forcements had arrived, some fair idea 



68 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

may be had of the value of General 
Smith's services and the part he actually 
performed in all that took place. If 
General Rosecrans had actually con- 
ceived and worked out all the details of 
the plan, which cannot be successfully 
claimed, there would still be enough left 
to the credit of General Smith to im- 
mortalize him, but when Grant, Thomas 
and all the other officers who were pres- 
ent and in position to know what was 
actualy done gave Smith the praise, not 
only for conceiving it, but carrying the 
plan into successful effect, there is but 
little room left for further controversy. 
If any additional testimony is needed 
as to the masterful part played by Smith 
at Chattanooga, it is found in the fact that 
Grant made haste to attach him to his 
own staff and to recommend him for pro- 
motion to the grade of major-general to 
take rank from the date of his original 
appointment, declaring in support of his 
recommendation that he felt " under 
more than ordinary obligations for the 
masterly manner in which he discharged 
the duties of his position." Later he 
recommended that Smith be put first of 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 69 



all the army on the list for promotion, 
adding : " He is possessed of one of the 
clearest military heads in the army, is 
very practical and industrious," and em- 
phasized it all with the highly eulogistic 
declaration that "no man in the army is 
better qualified than he for the largest 
military commands." 

It is noteworthy that about the same 
time General Butler with whom he had 
served for a short season, made an appli- 
cation to have General Smith re-assigned 
to his command, but the Secretary of 
War, having evidently forgotten his or- 
der for Smith's arrest at the close of the 
Gettysburg campaign, wrote : " The 
services of William F. Smith, now Chief 
Engineer in the Army of the Cumber- 
land, are indispensible in that command, 
and it will be impossible to assign him 
to your Department." But this was not 
all. General George H. Thomas, the 
soul of honor and fair dealing on the 20th 
of November, 1863, although General 
Smith had already been transferred from 
his own to the staff of General Grant, 
formally recommended him for promo- 
tion in the following striking and com- 



70 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

prehensive words : " For industry and 
energy displayed by him from the time 
of his reporting for duty at these head- 
quarters, in organizing the Engineer 
Department, and for his skillful execu- 
tion of the movements at Brown's Ferry, 
Tennessee, on the night of October 26th, 
1 863, in surprising the enemy and throw- 
ing a pontoon bridge acroos the Tennes- 
see River at that point, a vitally import- 
ant service necessary to the opening of 
communications between Bridgeport and 
Chattanooga." 

Certainly no language could be more 
clear and unequivocal than this, and yet, 
as though General Thomas wished to 
remove all chance of doubt as to whom 
the highest credit was due, he declared 
in a later and more formal official report: 
"To Brigadier General William F. Smith, 
Chief Engineer, should be accorded great 
praise for the ingenuity which conceived 
and the ability which executed the move- 
ments at Brown's Ferry." While even 
the best memory so long after the event 
is but little to be depended upon for 
details, it may serve especially when sup- 
plementing the records, to strengthen 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 71 

the conclusions therefrom. In this in- 
stance it should be stated that it was per- 
fectly well known to the late Charles A. 
Dana, then present at Chattanooga as 
Assistant Secretary of War, and also to 
myself, who was serving at the time on 
General Grant's staff as Inspector Gen- 
eral, and was in daily contact with all the 
leading officers, that it was General 
Smith, and General Smith alone, who 
conceived and carried out the plan actu- 
ally used for the capture of Brown's 
Ferry and the re-establishment of the 
direct line of communication between 
Chattanooga and Bridgeport. Indeed, 
there was no question in that army, or 
at that time, in regard to the matter. 
Rosecrans was never mentioned in con- 
nection with it, while Smith's praise was 
in everybody's mouth till the close of 
the campaign, not only for the Brown's 
Ferry movement, but, what was still 
more important, for the plan of opera- 
tions against Bragg's position on Mis- 
sionary Ridge. He it was who person- 
ally familiarized himself with the terrain 
in the entire field of operations, which, 
with the mountains, valleys, rivers and 



"jl GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

creeks, that gave it its unique character, 
was the most complicated and difficult 
one of the entire war, if not the most 
complicated and difficult one upon which 
a great battle was ever fought. It was 
he alone who worked out every detail 
of the combinations and movements by 
which the great victory of Missionary 
Ridge was won. I state this upon my 
own knowledge and not upon hearsay. 
Moreover, it was conceded by all in 
high command that Smith was easily the 
leading strategist in that entire host. He 
knew all the details of the ground and 
all the difficulties to be overcome, better 
than any other man. He studied them 
more closely, and with more intelligence 
than any other man, not only because it 
was his duty to do so, but because he 
was conscious of the portentous fact 
now so commonly lost sight of that the 
safety and success of the army depended 
upon the discovery and adoption of a 
feasible plan of action. Grant, the gen- 
eralissimo, had neither the time nor op- 
portunity to gather the facts. He was 
neither an engineer nor strange as it may 
seem, a close calculator of the chances. 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 73 

He necessarily depended upon the Chief 
Engineer, and the criticism which was 
sure to come from others, to gather and 
sift the data upon which final action must 
be based. Thomas was there from the 
first, able, methodical and invincible, a 
great field tactician, but not specially 
distinguished for his knowledge of engi- 
neering, grand tactics or strategy. Sher- 
man came afterwards. He was bold, 
active and energetic, and had a fine eye 
for topography. He knew as well as 
anyone what could be done and what 
could not be done by an army, but he 
came too late to take part in the original 
investigations, or to do anything more 
than to accept the part assigned to him, 
and from an examination of the ground 
say whether or not he could carry it out. 
The important fact is that Smith was, be- 
yond any question, the first mind among 
them all for working out just such prob- 
lems as confronted the leaders of the 
Union army at Chattanooga, and that task 
was by common consent assigned to him. 
The responsibility was Grant's. His 
judgment and resolution must necessarily 
decide and execute, but it was Smith's 



74 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 



place to gather the facts and work out the 
details of one of the most complicated 
military problems that was ever presented 
for solution, and it can hardly be too 
much to say that he discharged his task 
with such patience, skill and success as 
to justly entitle himself to be known in 
history as the Strategist of Chattanooga. 
Were his distinguished associates living, 
it cannot be doubted they would will- 
ingly concede that honor to him. In 
their official reports and correspondence 
at the time they went far beyond the 
usual limit to give him praise, and 
although Grant finally withdrew his 
friendship from him, for reasons which 
will be given hereafter, he never in the 
slightest degree withdrew or modified the 
praise he had awarded him for his servi- 
ces in the Chattanooga campaign. 

But to return to the details of the 
plan of operations. It was Smith who 
discovered the possibility of turning 
Bragg's position on Missionary Ridge, 
by the Army of the Tennessee. After 
personal examination of the lay of the 
ground he suggested that Sherman's 
army coming up from Bridgeport through 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 7$ 

LookoutValley should cross to the north 
side of the Tennessee by the bridge 
at Brown's Ferry, and after passing to 
the east side of Moccasin Point, under 
cover of the woods, to a position oppo- 
site the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, 
should re-cross the Tennessee River, by 
a bridge to be thrown under cover of 
darkness, and land on the end of Mis- 
sionary Ridge with the obvious purpose 
of marching along the Ridge and rolling 
up and destroying Bragg's army, or 
taking it in reverse and driving it from 
its line of supply and retreat. As early 
as the 8th of November, Mr. Dana, 
writing to the Secretary of War, speaks 
of a reconnoissance made by Thomas, 
Smith and Brannan on the north side 
of the river to a point opposite the 
mouth of Citico Creek, near the head of 
Missionary Ridge, which he thought at 
that time "proved Smith's plan of at- 
tack impractical." But further investi- 
gation proved that a passage could be 
made higher up the river, and when Sher- 
man was taken to the place that had 
been selected, examining both the place 
for the bridge and its approaches, on 



y6 GENERALWILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

both sides of the river, with his usual 
care, he closed his field glasses with a 
snap and turning to Smith said with 
emphasis: " Baldy, it can be done !" 

And so much of it as referred to the 
passage of the river was done without 
halt or fault, just as it had been planned. 
Sherman's entire army, except his rear 
division that had been cut off by a break 
in the Brown's Ferry floating bridge, was 
brought upon the field just in the way 
suggested and by the means which had 
been provided by General Smith. I as- 
sisted in transferring the troops to the 
South bank of the river at the point of 
crossing, by the use of the river steamer 
" Dunbar," which had been put under 
my command so as to make certain that 
a sufficient force should be on the ground 
in time to cover the construction of the 
bridge. The bridge was laid successfully 
and the army was transferred without 
delay. Every stage of the movement 
pointed to an onward and victorious 
march against Bragg's commanding 
position, and a complete victory was 
finally achieved, but much to the sur- 
prise and disappointment of all, it was 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 77 

not attained at the time nor in the way 
that had been expected. The prear- 
ranged plan, so far as it concerns Sher- 
man's army, had no other legitimate 
purpose than to land it on Bragg's ex- 
posed right flank and double him up or 
drive him from his regular line of supply 
and retreat. And there is nothing more 
certain than that there was no man in 
authority on either side who intended 
the battle to be fought as it was actually 
fought, nor who seriously expected the 
victory to be won in the way it finally 
was won by Thomas's army, and not by 
Sherman's. 

It is here worthy of remark that for 
nearly a quarter of a century both Grant 
and Sherman believed and contended — 
in fact both died in the belief — that 
Sherman's lodgement on the foot-hills 
at the north end of Missionary Ridge, 
and his unsuccessful attack from that 
place, caused Bragg to so weaken his 
center by withdrawing troops from his 
center and left, to resist Sherman, that 
Thomas met with but little resistance 
when he advanced to the attack about 
ten hours later, in obedience to Grant's 



78 GENERALWILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

personal order. But it has been shown 
by irrefutable testimony, and is now 
conceded, that there is not a word of 
truth in this supposition — "that nothing 
of the kind occurred," and that in face of 
all statements and suppositions to the 
contrary, however natural they may have 
seemed at the time, "not a single regi- 
ment, nor a single piece of artillery," 
not even "a single Confederate soldier 
was withdrawn from Thomas's front to 
Sherman's on the final day of the battle. 
All the Confederate reports are clear and 
specific on that point." 

The simple fact is that the plan of op- 
erations for Sherman were clear and per- 
fect, and they were carried out in their 
initial stage without fault or accident, 
but their execution in the final and vital 
stage was marred by Sherman himself 
or by his subordinates, who never reached 
the point from which they could strike a 
fatal blow, or from which they could 
have taken possession of Bragg's com- 
munications with the rear. 

That Sherman was entirely satisfied 
with Smith's part in carrying out the 
plan, is shown beyond dispute by his re- 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 79 

port, which bears " willing testimony to 
the completeness of this whole business. 
All the officers charged with the work 
were present and manifested a skill which 
I cannot praise too highly. I have never 
beheld any work done so quietly, so well, 
and I doubt if the history of war can 
show a bridge of * * 1350 feet, laid 
down so noiselessly and well in so short 
a time. I attribute it to the genius and in- 
telligence of General William F. Smith." 
The genuineness of this praise is strik- 
ingly attested by General Grant, who 
almost immediately after the battle again 
urged the Secretary of War to give Smith 
the promotion which he had previously 
recommended. Unmistakably referring 
to the part taken by Smith in making 
and carrying out the plans which had 
yielded such notable results, he wrote, 
among other things : " Recent events 
have entirely satisfied me of his great 
capabilities and merits. I hasten to re- 
new the recommendation and to urge it." 
Shortly afterwards Grant followed 
this letter by another asking for Smith's 
assignment to the command of East 
Tennessee, to succeed the luckless Burn- 



8o GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

side, with whom he was dissatisfied, but 
in so doing he intimated that it would 
be agreeable to him if the government 
should, in pursuance of a personal sug- 
gestion sent to the War Darpartment 
about the same time by Mr. Dana, give 
General Smith even a higher command. 
It is now well known that Grant had in 
mind the command of the Army of the 
Potomac, and not only then, but fre- 
quently afterwards, assured General 
Smith of his support for that great 
position. 

The friendship of Grant, Sherman 
and Thomas, for Smith, was at that time 
genuine and unmistakable. Neither of 
these great generals had ever served 
with him before. He was a comparative 
stranger to them, and that he should 
have come amongst them from the East 
under a cloud as he did, and should in 
less than two months have won such un- 
usual praise and recommendations is 
stronger testimony than their words 
themselves to the masterful part he had 
played at Chattanooga, and in recogni- 
tion of which the President made haste 
to promote him again to the rank of 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 8 I 



Major General, at that time the highest 
grade in the service. It is to be regret- 
ted, however, that the vacancy made by 
his previous non-confirmation, having 
long since been filled, and opposition 
having arisen on the part of other gen- 
erals already promoted and confirmed, 
the President did not feel justified in 
dating his new commission back to the 
date of his original appointment. The 
action of the President, the Secretary of 
War, who concurred in it, and the Sen- 
ate which acted upon it, this time with- 
out reference to the military committee, 
set the seal of government approval in 
the most signal manner upon the serv- 
ices and abilities of General Smith. No 
subsequent action or criticism can de- 
prive him of the great praise and un- 
usual honors which were then bestowed 
upon him. 

But a new and far less fortunate era 
was about to open upon General Smith's 
career. Grant's work in the west had, 
reached its close, and his extraordinary 
success had secured for him the full rank 
of Lieutenant General, with the com- 
mand of all the armies of the United 



82 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

States. It at once became known to me, 
and to others serving at that time on 
his staff, that it was from the first, and 
till he went east to take charge of his 
new duties, Grant's intention to assign 
Smith to the command of the Army of 
the Potomac. He had come to trust his 
intelligence, his judgment and his ex- 
traordinary coup d'oeil implicitly, and to 
regard him as a strategist of consummate 
ability. He made no concealment of 
his confidence in him, nor of his inten- 
tions in his behalf, and there can be but 
little doubt that he would have carried 
those intentions into effect could he have 
done so without injustice to others. But 
it is also true that after going to the 
eastern theatre of war and conferring 
with the President, Secretary Stanton, 
General Meade and General Butler, the 
Lieutenant General completely changed 
his mind, not only as to the proper plan 
of campaign for the army of the Potomac, 
which he had not previously visited or 
studied, but as to the disposition to be 
made of Smith and the other leading 
generals. In all this he had the saga- 
cious advice and support of General 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 83 

Rawlins, his Chief of Staff, and doubt- 
less of other influential persons. Exactly 
why he did so, or what were the details 
of the argument which brought him to 
his final conclusions, is still one of the 
most interesting unsettled questions of 
the war. The general argument has 
already been indicated in the compre- 
hensive language of Rawlins and that 
was doubtless strengthened by Mr. Lin- 
coln, whose homely but astute reasoning 
convinced him that the better and safer 
line of operations was overland against 
Lee's army wherever it might be en- 
countered, and not through a widely 
eccentric movement by water to a sec- 
ondary base on the James River and 
thence against Richmond. 

It is also doubtless true that finding 
Meade, who had shown himself to be a 
prudent and safe commander, if not a 
brilliant one, not only favorable to the 
overland route, but deservedly well 
thought of by the President, the cabinet 
and the army, while Smith, on the other 
hand, if not openly opposed to this plan 
of operations, was somewhat persistent 
as was his custom, in favoring a campaign 



84 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

from the lower James, or even from the 
sounds of North Carolina, Grant reached 
the conclusion that it would be better to 
retain Meade in immediate command of 
the principal army, and to place Smith 
over all the troops that could be mobil- 
ized from Fortress Monroe in Butler's 
department. Whatever may have been 
the open or secret influences at work, or 
the reasoning based upon the facts, this 
was Grant's first decision, but it is to be 
observed that the plan as adopted was 
afterwards fatally modified by permitting 
Butler, notwithstanding his partiality 
for Smith, as shown by his recent request 
for his re-assignment to his department, 
to take the field in person, with Smith 
commanding one of his army corps and 
Gillmore the other. In other words, 
Grant was not altogether a free agent, 
though the government had ostensibly 
given him a free hand. Of course, 
Smith knew that in any case he could 
not be permitted to make all the plans, 
even if he held the first subordinate 
command, and it is always possible that 
he had not specially endeared himself 
to the leading officers of the eastern 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 85 

armies, but there can hardly be a doubt 
that he would have given efficient and 
loyal support to Grant without reference 
to the plan of operations which it might 
be found necessary to adopt. 

Without pausing here to recapitulate 
the arguments for and against the line 
and general plan of operations actually 
selected by General Grant, or to con- 
sider further his choice of subordinate 
commanders, it may be well to call at- 
tention to the fact that the organization 
and arrangements made by him for the 
control and co-operation of the forces 
in Viginia, are now generally regarded 
by military critics as having been nearly 
as faulty as they could have been. It 
will be remembered that Meade, with a 
competent staff, had immediate com- 
mand of the Army of the Potomac, 
but was followed closely wherever he 
went by General Grant and his staff. 
At the same time Burnside, with the 
Ninth Corps, having an older commis- 
sion than Meade, and having been once 
in command of the Army of the Poto- 
mac, was for reasons which must be re- 
garded as largely sentimental, permitted 



86 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

to report directly to and receive his or- 
ders directly from Grant, while Butler 
with two army corps operating at first at 
a considerable distance and later in a 
semi-detached and less independent man- 
ner, made his reports to and received 
his instructions directly from Grant's 
headquarters. 

This arrangement, as might have been 
foreseen, was fatal to coherent and prompt 
co-operative action, and the result was 
properly described by Grant himself as 
comparable only to the work of a "balky 
team." It was in the nature of things 
impossible to make either the armies 
or the separate army-corps work harmo- 
niously and effectively together. The 
orders issued from the different head- 
quarters were necessarily lacking in uni- 
formity of style and expression, and 
failed to secure that prompt and unfail- 
ing obedience that in operations extend- 
ing over so wide and difficult a field was 
absolutely essential, and this was entirely 
independent of the merits of the different 
generals or the peculiarities of their Chiefs 
of Staff and Adjutants General. The 
forces were too great; they were scat- 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 87 



tered too widely over the field of oper- 
ations; the conditions of the roads, the 
width of the streams and the broken 
and wooded features of the battle fields 
were too various, and the means of trans- 
port and supply were too inadequate to 
permit of simultaneous and synchronous 
movements, even if they had been intel- 
ligently provided for, and the generals 
had uniformly done their best to carry 
them out. 

But when it is considered that Grant's 
own staff, although presided over by a 
very able man from civil life, and con- 
taining a number of zealous and experi- 
enced officers from both the regular army 
and the volunteers, was not organized 
for the arrangement of the multifarious 
details and combinations of the marches 
and battles of a great campaign, and in- 
deed under Grant's special instructions 
made no efforts to arrange them, it will 
be apparent that properly co-ordinated 
movements could not be counted upon. 
When it is furtherconsidered that Meade, 
Burnside, Butler, Hunter and afterwards 
Sheridan, as well as the corps com- 
manders, were left almost invariably to 



88 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

work out the details for themselves, it 
will be seen that prompt, orderly, simul- 
taneous and properly co-operating move- 
ments on an extended scale, from differ- 
ent parts of the same theatre of opera- 
tion, and that properly combined marches 
and battle movements were almost im- 
possible. As a fact they rarely ever 
took place, and it is not to be wondered 
at that the best officers of every grade 
in the armies operating in Virginia found 
much throughout the campaign, from 
beginning to end, to criticise and com- 
plain of. Nor is it to be thought strange 
that many of their best movements were 
successful rather because of good luck 
than of good management, or failed 
rather because of their defective execu- 
tion, than by the enemy's better arrange- 
ments or superior generalship, though it 
is evident that the Confederates kept 
their forces better in hand and operated 
more in masses than did the Union 
generals. Their organizations were sim- 
pler and more compact, their generals 
were better chosen and better supported. 
Operating generally on the defensive 
and fighting behind breastworks when- 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 89 

ever it was possible, it was all the more 
necessary to bring overwhelming forces 
to bear against them, in order to ensure 
their final overthrow. In addition to 
the defective organization and inefficient 
staff arrangements which have been men- 
tioned, neither the Union government 
nor the Union generals ever made pro- 
visions, or seemed to understand the 
necessity, for a sufficient preponderance 
of force, to neutralize the advantages 
which the Confederate armies enjoyed, 
when fighting on the defensive, or to 
render victory over them reasonably cer- 
tain. 

Looking back over the long series of 
partial victories, vexatious delays and 
humiliating failures, and considering the 
inadequate organization and defective 
staff arrangements for which Grant was 
mainly responsible, it is evident that the 
terrible losses in the Union army in the 
overland campaign were due quite as 
frequently to the latter causes as to in- 
competency or lack of vigor on the part 
of the subordinate commanders. The 
blind grapplings in the forests of the 
Wilderness could not be helped, when 



90 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

both armies were marching through it, 
for they could not see each other through 
the tangled underbrush till they were 
almost face to face, but it is now certain 
that if the marches of the Union army 
corps had been properly timed and prop- 
erly conducted, they could have reached 
the open country before the Confederate 
corps could have engaged them. But 
when the senseless assaults of fortified 
positions, which occurred in endless suc- 
cession, from Spottsylvania Court House 
to Petersburg are considered, it will be 
impossible to find sufficient excuse for 
them. They were in nearly every case 
the direct result of defective staff arrange- 
ments and the lack of proper prevision. 
In a few instances they were due to posi- 
tive incompetency on the part of sub- 
ordinate commanders, while on several 
notable occasions there was a woeful lack 
of responsible oversight and supervision 
on the part of those whose duty it 
should have been to exercise both. Be- 
fore the campaign was half over it had 
come to be an axiom among both officers 
and men that a well-defended rifle trench 
could not be carried by a direct attack 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 9 I 

without the most careful preparation nor 
even then without fearful loss. Such un- 
dertakings were far too costly, and far too 
frequently ended in failure, to justify 
them when they could be avoided. But 
no experience, however frequent or 
bloody, no remonstrance however forci- 
ble, could eradicate the practice of resort- 
ing to them occasionally. Rawlins was 
utterly opposed to them and never failed 
to inveigh against them but the advice of 
more than one trusted and influential 
staff officer was uniformly in favor of 
assaulting fortified positions. The fav- 
orite refrain at general headquarters is 
said to have been " Smash 'em up ! 
Smash 'em up!" 

It was with special reference to the 
application of this method of procedure 
at Cold Harbor, that General Smith 
afterwards gave vent to his indignation 
in words of the bitterest criticism. It 
will be remembered that the entire army 
confronting the enemy had advanced on 
that fatal day in compliance with a gen- 
eral order to attack "all along the line," 
which was done in a half-hearted, desul- 
tory manner, foreboding failure and 



92 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

defeat. Not a soul among the generals 
or in the righting line dreamed of suc- 
cess and not a commander from highest 
to lowest except Smith and Upton, 
made any adequate preparation to achieve 
it. Officers and men alike felt that they 
had been ordered to a sure defeat. 
Knowing intuitively what awaited them, 
they wrote their names on scraps of 
paper and pinned them to their coats in 
order that their bodies might be identi- 
fied after the slaughter was over. This 
done they advanced in long and waver- 
ing lines of blue against the enemy's 
bristling breastworks and rifle pits, and 
were mowed down like ripe grain before 
the scythe. In almost as short a time 
as it takes to recount the useless sacrifice, 
over twelve thousand Union soldiers 
were killed and wounded, without shak- 
ing the enemy's position or inflicting 
serious injury upon him. 

Smith and his gallant corps, did their 
part bravely in the futile attack. They 
were just back from Butler's abortive 
movement to Bermuda Hundred, in 
which by good management on the part 
of the General, and by steadiness on the 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 93 

part of the men, they had saved the 
expedition from a disgraceful defeat. 
They were not only hungry and tired, 
but disgusted with the incompetency of 
Butler and his abortive plans. The 
situation which confronted them was 
most discouraging. They were on new 
and unknown ground, but they had not 
yet worn themselves out against Lee's 
veterans and therefore they cheerfully 
took the position assigned them. Smith 
with his usual foresight and deliberation 
made haste to examine the ground in his 
front, and by availing himself of the 
advantages which his trained eye soon 
detected he was enabled to direct his 
main attack along a sheltering depression 
against a weak point, where he reached 
and broke through the enemy's line. He 
needed only the prompt and vigorous 
support that intelligent prevision and 
co-operation would have given, to make 
his lodgement safe and his victory cer- 
tain. But as no one above him seems 
to have expected victory, no proper pro- 
vision was made to ensure it. No sup- 
ports were at hand. Each corps com- 
mander was looking out for his own 



94 GENERALWILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

front only, and not for his neighbor's. 
The Confederates were more wise and 
more alert, and seeing the danger which 
threatened the continuity of their line, 
made haste to concentrate their forces 
against Smith and of course hurled him 
back with terrible loss. 

Smarting under this unnecessary dis- 
aster, and grieving over the useless loss 
and suffering of his gallant men, it was 
but natural that he should vent his feel- 
ings in sharp and caustic denunciation 
of all who were in any degree respon- 
sible for the blunder. He was especially 
outspoken with Grant and Rawlins, 
whose confidence he had won in the 
Chattanooga campaign, and with whom 
he had since been on terms of the 
closest intimacy and friendship. It is 
but just to note that they did not at that 
time appear to consider his criticism as 
in any sense directed against them nor 
did they rebuke or condemn it, but to the 
contrary they gave him every assurance 
of sympathy and approval. 

But Smith although one of the heavi- 
est sufferers, was not the only or even the 
severest critic, of the mismanagement or 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 95 

lack of management which characterized 
that disastrous day. The result was 
most demoralizing to the army. Officers 
of every grade were unreserved in their 
condemnation. The newspaper criti- 
cism was wide-spread and continuous. 
It was with special reference to the 
useless slaughter at Cold Harbor that the 
gallant and invincible Upton, then com- 
ing to be widely recognized as the best 
practical soldier of his day, immediately 
wrote in confidence to his sister. "I am 
disgusted with the generalship displayed. 
Our men have in many instances been 
foolishly and wantonly sacraflced. * * * 
Thousands of lives might have been 
spared by the exercise of a little skill; 
but as it is, the courage of the men is 
expected to obviate ail difficulties. I 
must confess that so long as I see such 
incompetency, there is no grade in the 
army to which I do not aspire." Later 
referring to the same battle, he adds: 
"On that day [at Cold Harbor] we had 
a murderous engagement. I say murder- 
ous, because we were recklessly ordered 
to assault the enemy's entrenchments 
knowing neither their strength nor 



g6 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 



position. * * * I am very sorry to add 
that I have seen but little generalship 
during the campaign. Some of our 
corps commanders are not fit to be 
corporals. Lazy and indifferent they 
will not even ride along their lines, yet 
without hesitancy they will order us to 
attack the enemy, no matter what their 
position or numbers." As the assault on 
Cold Harbor was a general one, it follows 
f course that it must have been ordered 
y someone higher in authority than 
either Smith of the Eighteenth or Upton 
of the Sixth Corps. 

It was doubtless in allusion to this and 
to similar instances that the veracious 
and outspoken Humphreys, at that time 
Meade's Chief of Staff, and afterwards 
the peerless commander of the Second 
Army Corps, wrote: "The incessant 
movements day and night for so long a 
period, the constant close contact with 
the enemy during all that time, the 
almost daily assaults upon intrench- 
ments having entanglements in front 
and defended by artillery and musketry 
in front and flank, exhausted both offi- 
cers and men." Although all the orders 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 97 

which brought about this unfortunate 
condition of affairs must have passed 
through Humphreys himself, it is 
obvious that they could not have origi- 
nated with him, but must have come 
from higher authority. 

If the imperturbable and painstaking 
Smith, fresh from the triumphs and con- 
fidences of Chattanooga, should have 
lost his patience under these distressing 
circumstances, and declared to General 
Grant, frankly and fearlessly as he did 
as was clearly his duty, that "there had 
been a fearful slaughter at Cold Har- 
bor," surely it should not have been 
brought up against him later as one of 
the reasons for relieving him from the 
command of the troops of the Depart- 
ment of the James, to which he had 
been assigned after this criticism had 
been made. If in the same interview 
Grant acknowledged, as it is credibly 
stated he did, "that there had been a 
butchery at Cold Harbor, but that he 
had said nothing about it, because it 
could do no good," his remembrance 
of the circumstance to the prejudice of 
Smith, must be regarded as an after- 



98 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

thought which had its origin in some 
cause not yet fully explained. 

It is altogether likely that Smith's 
criticism was repeated to others less 
entitled to speak than himself and that 
it was exaggerated into a direct attack 
upon both Meade and Grant, which 
could not be passed over lightly. Be 
this as it may, it must be apparent that 
it was fully justified as a mere matter of 
military criticism and quite independent 
of both Smith and Upton, it was gen- 
erally approved both by the army and 
the country at large. 

It was shortly after the assault in 
question, while I was commanding a 
division of cavalry, that I visited Grant's 
headquarters. During the conversation 
which followed the Lieutenant General 
asked me : " What is the matter with 
this army?" To which I replied: "It 
will take too long to explain, but I can 
tell you how to cure it. Give Parker [the 
Indian Chief] a tomahawk, a supply of 
commissary whiskey and a scalping knife 
and send him out with orders to bring 
in the scalps of general officers." Dur- 
ing this same visit and frequently after- 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 99 

wards Rawlins, in a white rage, inveighed 
against the desperate practice of blindly 
assaulting fortified lines, and denounced 
in unmeasured terms all who favored 
them or failed to make adequate prepara- 
tion for success, where any just excuse 
could be found for resorting to them. 
It is worthy of remark, without refer- 
ence to the origin of the practice, or to 
the persons who were responsible for it, 
that General Grant alone had the power 
to stop it, and that later there was a 
noticeable change in the Army of the 
Potomac in regard to that practice, 
although it should be noted that Sher- 
man followed it as an example in his 
desperate, but unsuccessful assault of the 
enemy's impregnable fortifications on 
Kenesaw Mountain, for the purpose, as 
he frankly explained, of showing that his 
army could also assault strongly fortified 
lines. 

That such a costly practice could 
spring up and obtain imitation in our 
army is a striking commentary upon the 
lack of intelligent supervision over the 
essential details of its daily operations. 
It affords ample justification for again 



LofC. 



IOO GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

calling attention to the fact that in this 
respect the Confederate Army was much 
better off and more fortunate than the 
Union Army. Its generals, although 
not without fault, were much more care- 
ful in the management of their military 
details than ours were. Jefferson Davis 
was himself an educated soldier of great 
capacity, and selected none but educated 
and experienced military men for high 
command. While Lee's staff was far 
from faultless in organization, he had 
supreme authority in the field, with no 
army or independent corps commanders 
between him and the troops. His army 
corps were led by generals of the first 
rank, who took their orders directly from 
him, and no unnecessary time was lost 
in their transmission or execution, nor 
was there any uncertainty as to whose 
duty it was to work out and superin- 
tend the details of attack and defence. 
But whatever may be said in further 
elucidation of this important subject, I 
cannot help expressing regret that Gen- 
eral Smith, who had shown such rare 
talents in another field, for planning and 
executing the most complicated move- 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT IOI 

ments, should not have had in this an 
opportunity to add to his fame, instead 
of being sent out as a subordinate to a 
general who, however great his talents 
as a lawyer and a militiaman, had devel- 
oped no special aptitude as an army com- 
mander. In this connection the import- 
ant fact should be recalled that Generals 
Barnard and Meigs, officers of the high- 
est training and distinction, at the request 
of General Grant, shortly after the fiasco 
of Bermuda Hundred, had been sent by 
the Washington authorities to make an 
investigation of General Butler's fitness 
for command in the field, and had with 
due deliberation reported that while 
" General Butler was a man of rare and 
great ability, he had not had either the 
training or experience to enable him to 
direct and control movements in battle." 
It was doubtless the verification of this 
report to Grant's satisfaction that caused 
him finally to relieve that General from 
duty in the field, and in doing so to incur 
both his active and his covert hostility. 
Meanwhile however valid and import- 
ant, in either a military or a political 
sense, the considerations may have been 



102 GENERALWILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

which sent Butler out in command of 
an army with such men as Smith and 
Gilmore, both professional soldiers of 
the highest standing, as his subordinates, 
the arrangement was unfortunate from 
beginning to end, and from its very 
nature it was foredoomed to failure. It 
is to be observed that while these admir- 
able soldiers were constantly with their 
troops moving against or confronting the 
enemy, Butler was generally at Fortress 
Monroe, or at a more central point some 
distance in the rear, and when his orders 
were not ill-timed or inapplicable to the 
case in hand, they were not infrequently 
deemed impracticable, or at cross purposes 
with the convictions of the generals whose 
duty it was to carry them into effect. 
The simple and incontrovertible fact 
is that General Butler's presence with 
that army was from the start embarrass- 
ing if not absolutely unnecessary. It 
interposed an intermediate commander 
between the generalissimo and two entire 
army corps, and however good the inten- 
tions of that commander or great his 
abilities, his principal influence was neces- 
sarily to derange and delay the orderly 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT IO3 

conduct and development of the cam- 
paign. It was productive of no good 
whatever, and was besides in direct viola- 
tion of the rule of experience which 
teaches that better results are to be 
expected with one poor commander in 
full authority than with two or more 
good ones liable to pull against each 
other. 

The chief conclusion to be reached 
from these considerations, and from a 
study of the records, in connection with 
the writings and unpublished memoirs 
of General Smith, is that his conduct 
during the continuance of the arrange- 
ment was not only natural and blame- 
less, but that the failure of Butler's army 
to play an important and decisive part, 
was due primarily, if not entirely, to 
Butler's own misunderstanding or mis- 
management of what was entrusted to 
him, or the inherent defects in the organ- 
ization and staff arrangements of the 
Union forces operating in Virginia. 
Under the conditions as they actually 
existed, effective co-operation and con- 
trol, it has been shown, could^not have 
been reasonably expected, and for this 



104 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

the verdict of the military critic and his- 
torian must be that the Lieutenant Gen- 
eral who had ample power, if he chose 
to exercise it, was primarily responsible. 
Under the incontrovertible facts of the 
case it is difficult to see how this conclu- 
sion can be avoided. 

It will be recalled by those who have 
read " Butler's Book," that in addition 
to a number of trivial derelictions of 
duty, General Smith was charged with 
the more serious one of having failed 
through negligence and an untimely ces- 
sation of operations, to capture Peters- 
burg, when it was claimed that all the 
conditions were favorable to success. It 
should also be recalled that several weeks 
after this failure had taken place and 
all the necessary explanations had been 
made and considered, the President had, 
on Grant's recommendation, relieved 
Butler from further service in the field 
and had assigned General Smith to 
the command of the Eighteenth Corps 
which was composed of the troops from 
Butler's department, serving with the 
Army of the Potomac. It should be 
remembered at the same time that before 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT IO5 

General Smith received this order he 
had applied for and been granted leave 
of absence on account of illness, or as 
he explained, " because of his old trouble 
with his head," and that while he was 
absent, the Lieutenant General was by 
some means never fully or satisfactorily 
explained, induced to restore Butler to 
his former command and to dispense 
entirely with the services of General 
Smith. In reply to a letter from Smith, 
he authorized Colonel Comstock of his 
staff to inform him that he had been 
relieved " because of the impossibility 
of his getting along with General But- 
ler," who was his senior in rank. But 
General Grant assured me about this 
time that it was with great regret that he 
had taken this action ; that he had tried 
in vain to utilize Smith's great talents ; 
that he had been too free in his criti- 
cisms, and that Smith himself had made 
it necessary that either he should be 
relieved or that Meade, Burnside and 
Butler should be deprived of command 
and sent out of the army. Some con- 
versation followed, in which it was sug- 
gested that he should have given the 



I06 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 



preference to the alternative as a means of 
simplifying the organization and increas- 
ing the efficiency of the army, and it is 
a singular coincidence at least, that this 
suggestion was partly carried into effect, 
with most excellent results, by the relief 
of both Butler and Burnside, shortly 
afterwards, from the command of troops 
in that theatre of operations. It has 
besides long been a question among 
military men whether still better results 
would not have been obtained if Grant 
had at the same time relieved Meade, 
who was certainly a most competent and 
loyal general, from the immediate com- 
mand of the Army of the Potomac and 
placed him instead at the head of an 
army corps. 

It may not be out of place here to 
call attention to the fact that while no 
specific limitations were ever put upon 
the responsibilities of Meade as an army 
commander, Grant thenceforth took up- 
on himself a closer supervision of the 
details of the campaign, while upon 
many occasions during the final opera- 
tions, he gave his orders directly to the 
corps commanders, instead of sending 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 107 

them through the regular official chan- 
nels. The result of this practice after 
it became confirmed, was in every case 
beneficial, though it should be observed 
that it was far from increasing the cor- 
dial relations between Grant and Meade 
or between their respective headquarters. 
But to return to the breach between 
Grant and Smith, to the exact state of 
facts which led up to it, and to the im- 
mediate pressure which finally brought 
about Smith's relief from further com- 
mand in the field. Much that is as 
well forgotten, has been written about 
this unfortunate episode. Smith felt to 
the day of his death that he had been 
misrepresented to Grant and unjustly 
injured by his action. He always con- 
tended that the whole truth had not 
been told, and it must be confessed that 
no consecutive and exhaustive analysis 
of the case has ever been made. Per- 
haps none can be made. But from such 
information as I have been able to gather, 
I have always supposed that Grant's 
action was based upon Smith's criticisms, 
exaggerated reports of which were made 
by certain officers of Butler's staff with 



I05 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

whom Smith dined and spent the night 
at Fortress Monroe on his way home, 
that Butler presented these reports in 
person to General Grant, without the 
knowledge or concurrence of Meade or 
Burnside, and made them the basis of a 
demand for Smith's immediate relief. 
Exactly what took place at the inter- 
view must for reasons which will appear 
hereafter, always remain a matter of con- 
jecture. It however seems to be prob- 
able that had General Smith deferred 
his leave of absence till he had seated 
himself firmly in his new command, or 
had he been sent for and allowed to make 
his own explanation, he would have been 
spared the humiliation, which ended his 
military career, while the country would 
have continued to receive the assistance 
of one of its greatest military minds. 

General Smith, by his military writ- 
ings, has not only refuted the unjust 
criticisms of General Butler's Book, but 
he has modestly and conclusively set 
forth his own military services during 
the various campaigns in which he took 
part. He points out with pardonable 
pride the friendship which sprang up 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT IO9 

during the Chattanooga campaign, be- 
tween himself and General Grant. He 
makes it clear that his failure to capture 
Petersburg was due to a number of 
causes more or less potential and alto- 
gether beyond his control. First among 
them was the physical exhaustion of him- 
self and his troops; second, an order 
which was sent to him through the signal 
corps from General Butler, who was all 
day June 1 5 at Point Lookout Signal 
Station, to stay his advance; and, third, 
the failure of General Hancock, who was 
with the Second Corps within supporting 
distance, to take up the movement and 
give the finishing stroke to the day's 
work. To these should be added the 
defective staff arrangements by which the 
various forces in the field of operations 
were controlled, the inadequate strength 
of Smith's command, which was inex- 
cusable where such a vast force was 
within call, the lack of engineer officers 
and of exact information as to the char- 
acter of the ground over which the troops 
were compelled to operate, and the total 
absence of proper support and co-opera- 
tion on the part of the Army of the 



I IO GENERALWILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

Potomac. Above all, it should be kept 
in mind that the enemy held the defen- 
sive and had interior lines upon which 
he could throw his troops from point to 
point on his threatened front, with 
greater celerity than the attacking force 
could be concentrated by outside lines 
and across wide rivers against him. 

When Smith began his movement 
against Petersburg, which was to be in 
the nature of a surprise, the greater 
part of Grant's army was still north of 
the James River, and both Meade and 
Hancock allege that they were not noti- 
fied that a new effort was to be made to 
capture Petersburg by Smith alone, after 
Butler had tried and failed with his whole 
army to isolate and cut it off from Rich- 
mond by the movement to Bermuda 
Hundred. Both of these able officers 
declare that if they had known in time 
that Petersburg was to have been cap- 
tured, Petersburg would have been cap- 
tured. This simple statement, without 
reference to its truth, which has never 
been questioned, is conclusive evidence 
that the staff" arrangements and the 
organization of the machinery of com- 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT I I I 

mand were fatally defective, for had it 
been otherwise, every officer who could 
have been called upon to take part in 
the movement, or could have been 
expected to co-operate with it, would 
have been so clearly instructed as to 
make his duty entirely plain. 

General Smith, in explanation of why 
he was relieved from command in the 
field, not only reflects strongly upon the 
conduct of General Butler, but endeavors 
to show that General Grant "was forced" 
by Butler to restore him to full com- 
mand, in order to prevent the exposure 
of his own conduct, yet even if this 
were true it necessarily leaves both the 
question of fact and the question of 
motives in the dark. Certain letters 
which passed between Smith, Grant, 
Rawlins and Butler have been quoted, 
for the purpose of illustrating the charac- 
ter of the persons concerned. They 
will be found in the Records and they 
throw much light upon the subject, but 
they still leave the reason of Smith's 
removal in obscurity. 

It cannot be denied that Smith was a 
man of great talents and conspicuous 



112 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

services, with unusual powers of caustic 
criticism, who had been badly injured by 
the way in which his connection with the 
Army of the James had been severed. 
His views and conduct had been im- 
pugned, not only then, but afterwards, 
in both the newspapers and the personal 
statements of the day, and hence it was 
but natural that he should retort with 
an appeal to the facts of a private nature 
more or less commented upon at the 
time, to expose the reasons for official 
action and to vindicate his own conduct. 
He strenuously contended that he was 
under no obligation to conceal any 
important facts of the case connected 
either personally or officially with those 
who were using him unkindly to the 
prejudice of the public welfare, especially 
where those facts were believed to be 
a potential factor in influencing their 
official acts and in shaping history. 

It must be confessed that Grant's ex- 
planations of his later attitude towards 
Smith, and of the reasons for relieving 
him and restoring Butler to command, 
were neither full nor always stated in the 
same terms. He ignores the subject 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT II3 

entirely in his memoirs, but it so happens 
that Mr. Dana, then Assistant Secre- 
tary of War, was sitting with General 
Grant when Butler, clad in full uniform, 
called at headquarters and was admitted. 
Dana describes Butler as entering the 
General's presence with a flushed face 
and a haughty air, holding out the order, 
relieving him from command in the 
field, and asking: "General Grant, did 
you issue this order?" To which Grant 
in a hesitating manner replied: "No, 
not in that form." Dana, perceiving at 
this point that the subject under discus- 
sion was an embarrassing one, and that 
the interview was likely to be unpleas- 
ant, if not stormy, at once took his 
leave, but the impression made upon his 
mind by what he saw while present was 
that Butler had in some measure "cowed" 
his commanding officer. What further 
took place neither General Grant nor 
Mr. Dana has ever said. Butler's Book, 
however, contains what purports to be 
a full account of the interview, but it is 
to be observed that it signally fails to 
recite any circumstance of an overbear- 
ing nature. It is abundantly evident, 



114 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

however, from the history of the times 
and from contemporaneous documents 
published in the Records, that neither 
the working arrangements by which 
Butler commanded an army from his 
headquarters at Fortress Monroe or in 
the field while the major part of it, under 
the command of Smith, was co-operating 
with the Army of the Potomac, nor his 
relations with either his superiors or sub- 
ordinates, were at all satisfactory. In 
the nature of the case, they could not be. 
Butler was a lawyer and politician accus- 
tomed to browbeat where he could not 
persuade. He and Smith while starting 
out as friends, early came to distrust 
each other. Smith, who was as before 
stated on intimate terms at general head- 
quarters, made his views fully known 
from time to time, and especially in a 
frank and manly letter of July 2, 1884, 
to both Rawlins and Grant, and from 
the correspondence of the latter with 
Halleck, it is certain that both sympa- 
thized with Smith at first. It was 
evidently at Grant's request to Halleck, 
then acting as chief of staff and military 
adviser at Washington, that Smith was 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT I I 5 

assigned to the Eighteenth Corps, and at 
Grant's request that he was relieved from 
it, without explanation. The undisputed 
fact is that the countermanding order was 
issued after a personal interview between 
Grant and Butler, the details of which 
are only partly known, and that no fur- 
ther explanation consistent with the con- 
tinuance of friendly relations between 
Grant and Smith has ever been given. 
The inference to be drawn from the 
records, the correspondence, the conver- 
sations and the writings of all the parties 
thereto, is that the representations of 
Butler, and especially his comments upon 
Smith's criticism of the battles and man- 
agement of the campaign, were the prin- 
cipal factors in convincing Grant that 
the best way out of the complications 
was to relieve Smith and restore Butler 
to full command. This way had been 
foreseen and suggested by Smith him- 
self, for he had asked more than once 
to be relieved from further service in the 
field on account of ill health, which made 
it impossible for him to undergo exposure 
to the hot sun, but his request had been 
denied, doubtless from a sincere desire 



lib GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

on Grant's part to have the advantages 
of his services in the solution of the 
complicated problem which yet con- 
fronted the army. Had this request 
been granted when made, or had it been 
granted afterwards, and placed on the 
the ground of a personal favor for the 
benefit of his health, which might well 
have been done, General Smith has 
frankly admitted that he would have 
had no shadow of excuse for anything 
but thanks. But when he was relieved 
without notice or any assignment of 
cause, as he was starting on sick leave, 
and the order was concealed from him 
till he had returned, a suspicion at once 
arose in his mind as to the motives which 
inspired it, and the suspicion was claimed 
by him as a sufficient justification for 
telling the world all he knew in regard 
to those who were responsible for the 
action of which he complains. His 
military criticism, however indiscreet, had 
always been direct and manly. Its sound- 
ness had been approved by some of the 
best officers in the service, including 
Grant himself, but it must be observed 
that the latter in his final report of the 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT I I 7 



campaign, takes pains to make the point, 
evidently to forestall criticism, that he 
held himself responsible for only the 
general plans of the campaigns and oper- 
ations, and that in accordance with an 
invariable habit, he left the details and 
the actual conduct of the battles to his 
subordinate commanders. The wisdom 
of this arrangement is not here in ques- 
tion, though much might be said against 
it. Its effect, if admitted, as a sound 
rule of action, must be to transfer the 
responsibility for a bloody and costly 
campaign to the shoulders of Meade, 
Humphreys, Burnside, Butler, Sheridan, 
Hunter, and in a number of cases even 
to those of corps and division command- 
ers, instead of leaving it where it more 
justly belongs, on the shoulders of those 
who were responsible for the working 
organization of the army, and for the 
details of its staff arrangements. 

General Smith's true place in history 
does not depend solely on these con- 
siderations, nor on his contributions to 
the history or criticism of the war. For- 
tunately for him the military committee 
of the House of Representatives of the 



I I 8 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

Fiftieth Congress on its own motion, long 
after all these incidents had been closed, 
investigated his military career, for the 
purpose of deciding upon his fitness for 
the retired list, and on April 20, 1888, 
it submitted to the House of Represen- 
tatives a highly favorable report, from 
which the following extract is taken: 

"On October, 1863, he [General 
Smith] was transferred to the West, 
where he in turn became Chief Engineer 
of the Department of the Cumberland, 
on the staff of General George H. 
Thomas, and of the Military Division 
of the Mississippi, on the staff of Gen- 
eral Grant. As such he devised the 
plan of operations by which the Army 
of the Cumberland was saved from 
starvation and capture at Chattanooga, 
and was duly credited with the same by 
General Thomas. He also devised the 
plan of operations by which Bragg's 
army was overthrown and driven back 
from Missionary Ridge, for which ser- 
vices he was again appointed and this 
time confirmed as Major General of 
Volunteers, also as Brevet Brigadier 
General, United States Army." 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT II9 

After referring to other incidents of 
his life, which have been considered 
more fully in this account of his public 
services and need not be repeated here, 
this report added, although General 
Smith had resigned from the army many 
years before, that he was " fully entitled 
at the hands of the government to be 
retired for a lifetime of hard and con- 
spicuous service, in which he has dis- 
played the most incorruptible honesty, 
the most outspoken patriotism and devo- 
tion and the highest ability. It has been 
the good fortune of but few men in any 
age or in any country to save an army 
and to direct it to victory, from a 
subordinate position. Such service in 
Europe would secure honor and riches. 
In ours it should certainly result in an 
assignment to a place on the retired list 
of the army, with the rank of Major 
General, and the appropriate pay for 
the remaining years of his life. The 
committee therefore unanimously recom- 
mend the passage of the bill." 

The final action taken in this case, 
while highly creditable to General Smith, 
was not as liberal as the House Commit- 



120 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

tee thought it ought to be. The Senate 
Committee, while concurring in the com- 
mendation of the General, in conformity 
to its own practice cut his rank on the 
retired list down to that of Major, which 
was the actual grade he held in the regu- 
lar army at the date of his resignation. 
It was a piece of ungracious and nig- 
gardly economy, for the services which 
entitled him to retirement were those of 
a general officer, and as he was actually 
promoted from Brigadier General to 
Major General in recognition thereof, 
the House of Representatives was clearly 
right in recommending his retirement 
with the higher grade. General Smith, 
who had not in any way asked for 
this recognition, was strongly inclined 
to decline it, but on the solicitation of 
his friends he finally accepted it. 

At the end of the war General Smith, 
notwithstanding the differences which 
had arisen between him and his official 
superiors, received the brevet of Major 
General for "gallant and meritorious ser- 
vices in the field during the rebellion." 

After his relief from further service 
in the field, General Smith remained at 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT 121 

New York, awaiting orders, till Novem- 
ber 24th, 1864, at which time he was 
assigned to special duty under the orders 
of the Secretary of War. This detail 
was voluntarily tendered and took him 
to New Orleans, where he was engaged 
in looking into the military administra- 
tion of the department, under Butler and 
his successors, and in reference to which 
he made several confidential reports 
which have never been given to the pub- 
lic. Perceiving that his military career 
was practically at an end, and that he 
was not likely to receive satisfactory 
recognition on the reorganization of the 
army, he resigned his volunteer commis- 
sion on the 4th of November, 1865, 
and took a leave of absence as a Major 
of Engineers, from December 1 5th, 
1865, to March 7th, 1867, on which 
later date his resignation from the army 
was accepted. He had meanwhile taken 
employment as President of the Inter- 
national Ocean Telegraph Company, 
and had visited Florida, Cuba and Spain 
for the purpose of obtaining an exclusive 
concession for a term of years, for laying, 
maintaining and operating an ocean tele- 



122 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

graph cable from Jacksonville to Havana. 
He was most successful in his negotia- 
tions, and in the construction and man- 
agement of his lines, till 1873, when ne 
and his associates sold out under advan- 
tageous terms to the Western Union 
Telegraph Company. For the next 
two years he resided abroad, mostlv in 
England, with his family. During this 
time he visited nearly all the countries 
of western Europe, where he met and 
made the acquaintance of many leading 
men in the highest walks of life. 

In May, 1873, General Smith was 
appointed one of the police commis- 
sioners for New York City, which place 
he filled till December 31st of that vear, 
when he was appointed president of the 
board. He held this office till March 
nth, 1 88 1, during which time he took 
an important part in elevating and per- 
fecting the police service. He was, 
however, too honest and independent 
to get on harmoniously with the poli- 
ticians, and after an open breach with a 
number of them, including the Mayor, 
he resigned his position and retired to 
private life. 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT I 23 



While engaged in this service he took 
an active interest in the presidential 
campaign. It will be remembered that 
the closeness of the vote between Mr. 
Tilden and General Hayes, and the 
high degree of tension 'between the 
opposing parties and their managers, 
filled the country with alarm, in the 
midst of which General Smith was con- 
sulted by the friends of Mr. Tilden, 
with the view of devising measures 
against the possibility of a subversion of 
the government by military or arbitrary 
power, but fortunately the device and 
action of the Electoral Commission 
averted all danger of that sort. The 
timid and vacillating behavior of Mr. 
Tilden during the emergency and after- 
wards was, however, a powerful factor in 
the estrangement of his supporters, and 
did much to bring about the nomination 
of General Hancock by the next Dem- 
ocratic National Convention. General 
Smith and his friend General Franklin 
took an active interest in the canvass 
and convention, and although they were 
soldiers without political experience, it 
is believed that their endorsement of 



124 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

Hancock and their work in his behalf 
was one of the most powerful influences 
in securing his nomination. They had 
been his life-long friends and his com- 
rade during the great conflict, and hence 
felt justified in giving him their most 
earnest support. 

At the close of the presidential cam- 
paign, the result of which was necessarily 
disappointing to General Smith, he was 
compelled, by unfortunate investments, 
to look about for an occupation. His 
friend, General John Newton was then 
Chief of Engineers and the system of 
Internal Improvements, which had long 
been favored by the Republican party, 
was being carried forward by bountiful 
appropriations from Congress. Many 
officers and civil engineers were required 
for the supervision of the various river 
and harbor works, and General Smith, 
having had wide experience, was, by the 
act of his friend, appointed Government 
Agent, and placed in charge of the works 
on the Peninsula between the Delaware 
and Chesapeake Bays, with his head- 
quarters at Wilmington, Delaware. On 
March ist, 1889, he was, in compliance 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT I 25 

with a special Act of Congress, put upon 
the retired list of the army, with the rank 
of Major. This at once raised the ques- 
tion whether he could draw the pay ap- 
propriate to his retired rank, and at the 
same time receive pay as a Government 
Agent. After argument by his friend, 
the Honorable Anthony Higgins, the 
United States Senator from Delaware, 
the case was decided in his favor on the 
theory that an "agent" was not an officer, 
within the meaning of the law. The 
decision in this case was similar to that 
made in the case of Quartermaster Gen- 
eral Meigs, who was employed to super- 
vise the construction of the Pension 
Office in Washington, after he had been 
placed on the retired list. Under the 
decision General Smith continued to per- 
form the duties and draw the pay of 
Agent, till 1901, when he voluntarily 
gave up the appointment and definitively 
retired from business of every kind. 
For the last ten years or more he resided 
in Philadelphia, where he enjoyed the 
acquaintance and society of his chosen 
friends to within a few weeks of his 
death, which occurred on the 28th day 



126 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

of February, 1903, four years subse- 
quent to the death of his wife. 

He retained his wonderful intellectual 
powers, absolutely unimpaired, to the 
date of his final illness. With keen wit, 
sparkling repartee and a mind always on 
the alert for fresh information and the 
beauties of literature, he remained a 
delightful and instructive companion to 
the end. Firm in the Christian faith 
and fully satisfied that life had nothing 
further in store for him worth waiting 
for, he took his departure into the Silent 
Land composed and free from regret, 
like a strong man going to sleep. He 
left a son and daughter with many friends 
and hosts of companions scattered 
throughout the country to mourn his 
loss. His native State had filled his 
heart with pride and satisfaction by giving 
place on the walls of its capital to a 
bronze effigy and tablet with a laudatory 
inscription celebrating his virtues and his 
most distinguished services, and handing 
down his memory to future generations 
as one in every way worthy of their 
respect and admiration. 

I cannot close this sketch without 



u 



%. 





THE 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF W 
GRANT, DATED DECEMBER 21,181 

IN THE NATION'S LIFE HE WAS IN i 
LINCOLN.STANTON AND GRANT, AS! 
FOR THE MOST IMPOR 






OUT OF EAST TE 
THE POTOMAC^ 
SECOND PROPOSITI 
U. SMITH SHOULD BE I 
THAT ARMY-r^-- -.BOTH THE S 
AND GEN . HALLECK SAID^ * * 
WOULD BE THE BEST PER: " 
THE PRESIDENT THE SECRETAR 
AGREE WITH YOU IN THINKING , 
WHOLE MUCH BETTER TO SELECT 



SERIES I VOL. XXXI PACE 457 OFFK 
• UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES.( WAR OF THE REBELLION 




BRONZE TABLET TO GENERAL WM. F. SMITH 
IN STATE HOUSE AT MONTPELIER, VERMONT. 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT I 2J 

repeating in part my personal testimony 
to the strength and elevation of General 
Smith's character. He was blessed by 
a singularly clear, orderly and compre- 
hensive mind, and was most industrious 
and persistent in its use. Somewhat 
phlegmatic and deliberate in tempera- 
ment and manner, he gave the impress- 
ion occasionally that he was lacking in 
push and energy, but such was not the 
case in fact. During his services on the 
Rio Grande he suffered, as previously 
related, a malarial attack from which it 
is now evident he never entirely recov- 
ered. Under exposure to the summer 
sun, he was for the rest of his life liable 
to a recurrence of the symptoms espe- 
cially those pertaining to the head, and 
this may have made him more or less 
irascible at times. Military habits are 
at best not calculated to develop a mild 
and patient behavior, nor to beget a 
spirit of resignation to unjust or arbi- 
trary treatment, especially if it comes from 
higher authority, and is not merited. 

General Smith was the last man to 
lay claim to a saint-like character, but 
according to those who knew him best 



128 GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 

he possessed a just and even a charita- 
ble disposition, which made him fair 
towards his equals and most considerate 
towards his subordinates. He was, how- 
ever, above all things, logical, and as a 
close student of his profession, he in- 
variably followed the established prin- 
ciples of the military art to their legiti- 
mate conclusions. In the presence of 
great military problems and responsibil- 
ities such as those with which he had to 
deal at Chattanooga, he became absorbed 
and reticent if not austere and had but 
little to say except to those with whom 
it was his duty to talk. There the solu- 
tion was so clearly his own that no one 
thought of disputing it with him till 
years afterwards. But in the conduct 
of operations against Lee, there were so 
many roads open, so many commanders 
in the field, and so many plans of oper- 
ations suggested, so many considerations 
to be observed that no one man except 
Grant who was clad with special powers 
for the emergency, could hope for the 
honor of directing all movements. That 
became his exclusive function as soon as 
he was made Lieutenant General, but 



HEROES OF THE GREAT CONFLICT I 29 



unfortunately, as has been shown, he and 
Smith began drifting apart from the day 
of their arrival in the East, and long 
before the great task before them was ac- 
complished they had by their own pecu- 
liarities, looking at the problem from 
different points of view, and aided doubt- 
less by the misrepresentations and self- 
ish purposes of others, become hope- 
lessly out of harmony with each other. 
This is not the place to pronounce 
final judgment between them. They 
knew each other well, and although 
Grant had said towards the close of their 
friendship, "General Smith, while a very 
able officer, is obstinate, and is likely to 
condemn whatever is not suggested by 
himself," he had shown an earnest desire 
that his great talents should be utilized. 
On the other hand Smith, who was 
intimately acquainted with both the 
strength and the weaknesses of Grant's 
character, had full confidence in the 
soundness of his judgment, when left 
free from prejudice and misrepresenta- 
tion, to act upon a full statement of the 
facts. Neither had hitherto shown him- 
self to be particularly sensitive to criti- 



I3O GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH 



cism from the other, and both were in 
the highest degree patriotic and loyal to 
the cause; They had worked harmoni- 
ously and with marked success together 
in the West. Not a shadow had come 
between them. The case must therefore 
have been a most complicated one which 
made it impossible for them to work 
together in the same manner and to the 
same end in the East. The severance of 
their relationship, to whatever influence 
it may be attributed, is profoundedly to 
be regretted, not only because it prema- 
turely ended the military career of Gen- 
eral Smith, but because it must have in- 
juriously affected the fortunes of General 
Grant as well as of the country and the 
army, at a time when both sorely needed 
the help of every capable soldier. These 
results are all the more to be deplored 
because no one can study the circum- 
stances connected therewith, without 
reaching the conclusion that they were 
brought about by methods which were 
themselves not above criticism, and 
which finally resulted in the downfall of 
their author. 

THE END. 




OCT 193? 

BBKKEEPER 



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